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Abstract 
The states of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) each have 
remarkably different interests and orientations when it comes to their foreign 
policy. One would think that 3 small Post-Soviet states occupying the same 
geographical region, with common histories of domination by neighbouring 
powers, would have operate in similar ways towards their larger neighbours and 
the rest of the world. In point of fact, the opposite is true – each state has its own 
unique orientation, which can be seen clearest in the way each state conducts its 
own foreign policy. There is, of course, a multitude of reasons explaining this 
divergence in foreign policy. Using a neoclassical realist theoretical basis, this study 
aims to examine foreign policy by identifying both system- and unit-level variables 
that have influenced foreign policy in the countries of the South Caucasus since 
gaining their independence while testing the applicability of a theory for small state 
foreign policy analysis. Drawing upon information gathered from primary 
interviews with foreign policy experts in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, the 
study shows that unit-level intervening variables do have some influence on foreign 
policy making at various times and under various conditions. As such, the study 
demonstrates the utility of neoclassical realism in small state foreign policy analysis.   
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1 Introduction 
Over the course of the last twenty-eight years, the countries of the South Caucasus have 
found themselves at the centre of some of the greatest political, economic, and cultural 
upheavals in living history. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, to which they had belonged 
as constituent republics, meant that these new independent states had a freedom that they 
had never known. However, the euphoria of gaining their newly gained independence was 
short-lived. A number of ethnic conflicts exploded around the region, which had been brewing 
since the late Soviet-period, during which every South Caucasian country was affected. These 
conflicts had an impact on almost every part of life in the South Caucasus and large numbers 
of displaced people were sent away from their homes to live in more ethnically homogenous 
regions.  
Since gaining their independence, the countries of the South Caucasus have embarked on 
very different paths in terms of their foreign policy orientation. Georgia has developed a very 
pro-western foreign policy, which ultimately aims for Georgia to join Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, namely the European Union and NATO. Armenia, on the other hand, has 
maintained an extremely close strategic partnership with Russia, which has led to Armenia 
joining the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and more recently the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia’s EU inspired political and economic integration 
project. Azerbaijan, in contrast to its neighbours, has quite a different approach. Its abundant 
natural resources (mainly oil and natural gas) have allowed Azerbaijan much greater 
independence from Russia, as well as the flexibility to pursue a largely independent foreign 
policy agenda. 
By using a most similar systems design, it is possible to examine the factors that have 
influenced the foreign policies of three countries in the same region, with similar political 
systems and who each are each similar in terms of the region they occupy, their size, political 
systems, as well as their common history as former constituent republics of the Soviet Union.  
In theoretical terms, by using a neoclassical realist framework it should be possible to provide 
a clearer picture of the way these countries orient themselves towards each other, their 
neighbours, and the rest of the world. Neoclassical realism as a theoretical concept predicts 
that, while such system-level factors as the international system and a state’s relative power 
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capabilities are the main driving force behind foreign policy decision-making, intervening 
variables on the unit (domestic) level of analysis also play an important part in this process. 
Therefore, in undertaking a neoclassical realist study of foreign policy in the South Caucasus, 
it is necessary to examine the external dimension of a state’s position in the international 
system and its relative power capabilities, as well as important domestic factors ranging from 
the levels of individual foreign policy decisionmakers and the ideology of governing regimes, 
to the levels of domestic institutions and societal beliefs and attitudes. Moreover, by using 
neoclassical realist theory to examine these three countries, the study can also present itself 
as a test of how useful this particular theory is in the study of small states with very different 
foreign policy orientations. The main utility of neoclassical realism lies in its explanatory 
power, which allows for a comprehensive foreign policy analysis, reconciling the realist 
predictions of the main role of systemic stimuli with unit-level intervening variables by 
creating a framework that effectively incorporates these variables, which were before the 
main concern of constructivist theories, without changing the fundamental realist foundation.  
The aim of this thesis is to identify unit-level intervening variables that have been of influence 
in the three countries since they gained their independence from the Soviet Union. In doing 
so, I hope to contribute to existing neoclassical realist studies of foreign policy by offering 
three case studies to which to apply the theory. Furthermore, I hope to shed light on small 
state foreign policymaking by applying a theoretical model that takes into account both unit- 
and system-level variables. The research puzzle (as discussed further below) is an anomalous 
occurrence in the international system, in this case three similar countries with very different 
foreign policies and, as such, using a neoclassical realist theoretical framework, this study 
aims to identify and analyse what intervening variables, if any, influence foreign policymaking 
in these countries. This is in contrast to previous neoclassical realist studies of the region, 
which previously only considered one or two intervening variables, often in only one country. 
Moreover, I hope to do this by drawing upon previous studies, as well as primary source 
information gained by myself conducting in-depth interviews with foreign policy experts in 
each of the three countries, which I will analyse in due course.    
In the first chapter, a theoretical background will be provided, conceptualising the main 
neoclassical realist theoretical framework through which this study examines foreign policy. 
This section will conceptualise the variables under analysis in this study, which as a 
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neoclassical realist study will employ not only a dependent (DV) and independent (IV) 
variable, but also intervening variables (IVV), the use of which will be explained in due course. 
Moreover, the different variables will be connected and applied to the original research 
collected for this study.  
The next chapter will review previous foreign policy literature, covering many sources and 
concepts relating to small state foreign policy, as well as previous studies that have also 
employed a neoclassical realist framework. This section will also contain more country specific 
analyses of foreign policy in the region, discussing a number of studies that have been done 
and their contribution to the field of study, as well as their drawbacks.  
After this, the methodology chapter will operationalise the variables and explain the ways in 
which they will be used to analyse the information collected in the interviews. This section 
will also offer a conceptualisation for small states according to previous research. Moreover, 
the research methods used to gather the original information used in this study will be 
discussed.  
Thereafter, the research that I have undertaken as part of this thesis will be discussed, based 
on the interviews with experts who offered their analysis of foreign policy in the South 
Caucasus. In the interviews, I discussed with each expert about what they consider to be the 
main issues influencing policymakers in their respective countries. With this information, I am 
able to identify occurrences in which the earlier clarified intervening unit-level variables, as 
well as system-level variables play a role in foreign policymaking and in what way these 
variables in each country affect its foreign policy in relation to the theories used in this study. 
A conclusion will then be given.  
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2 Theoretical Background  
According to Kenneth Waltz (1979), states generally try to emulate the successful practices of 
other states, be they economic, political, military, technological etc. Moreover, in the face of 
threats, larger states tend to balance against more powerful states by building alliances or 
coalitions against them (Waltz, 1979). This assertion is backed up by Stephen Walt (1985), 
who asserts that “bandwagoning behaviour stands in sharp contrast to the predictions of 
balance of power theory” (p.8) because states with the power to form alliances against larger 
threatening powers seek to do so with smaller partners so as not to be dominated by other 
states, as would happen if they were to bandwagon with an aggressor, thus finding 
themselves at its mercy (p.5). However, this theory applies more to the primary cases of great 
power politics, and less to the foreign policy of smaller and weaker states. As Walt (1985) 
notes:  
“…small and weak states in close proximity to a great power are the most likely candidates 
for bandwagoning. Because they will be the first victims of an attack, because potential 
allies may be scarce or distant, and because they lack the capabilities to stand alone or alter 
the balance significantly, accommodating a neighboring great power may occasionally make 
more sense.” (p.18) 
However, Walt concedes that, in spite of this, occurrences of bandwagoning are rare, and a 
bandwagoning relationship will often falter due to disparities. Moreover, even in a case of 
bandwagoning by a smaller state, the consequences for the international community will be 
minor (p.18). A key issue with this theory is that, while explaining general tendencies in the 
international system, “[it] does not explain why and how states choose among different 
types of “internal” balancing strategies” (Taliaferro, 2006, p. 466). That is, it does not seek 
to explain the multitude of internal processes that affect foreign policy decision-makers and 
their state’s capacity to extract the resources needed to conduct foreign policy.  
Because neorealist theory, in its raw sense, does not take into account the role of unit level 
(domestic) variables in foreign policymaking, other theories have been developed to 
approach foreign policy analysis from the domestic level. According to Gideon Rose (1998), 
one of the main such theories of foreign policy is “Innenpolitik”, which focuses almost 
exclusively on the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy (p.148). Innenpolitik holds 
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that to find out why a country behaves the way it does, one must take into account domestic 
factors (such as political ideology, political systems, socioeconomic structures etc.) and 
examine the role these play in influencing a state’s foreign policy (p.148). A key example of 
this theory is democratic peace, which holds that democracies behave differently when they 
deal with each other (p.148). However, the key issue with Innenpolitik theory in terms of small 
state foreign policy analysis is because it ascribes the main explanatory power to domestic 
processes in foreign policy. Due to the nature of small states in the international system 
(namely that they are far more constricted by it than larger countries), it is generally agreed 
that it is more likely that system-level factors will play a larger role in small state foreign 
policymaking (Elman, 1995, p. 172).    
In contrast to Innenpolitik theory, a number of realist theories have been developed, which 
draw upon Waltz’s fundamental neorealist theory and stress the supreme role of the 
international system in foreign policymaking. Offensive realism takes states as rational actors 
seeking security “by maximising their relative advantage” in a Hobbesian world of 
international anarchy (p.149). As a result, states seeking security are bound to come into 
conflict with others if they perceive that their position in the international environment will 
be more secure because of it (p.149). In this way, conflict is the natural result of rational actors 
trying to improve their security by increasing their relative advantage. In order to understand 
foreign policy, according to the theory, the researcher should look to the international 
environment and the state’s relative capabilities, which are easily translated into foreign 
policy and “shape how a state chooses to advance its interests” (p.149).  
 Defensive realism, on the other hand, presumes that security is more plentiful and, as such, 
states only need to concern themselves when an external threat appears. Moreover, even 
when such a threat appears, states tend to employ a balancing strategy, thus “deter[ing] the 
threatener and obviat[ing] the need for actual conflict” (p.149). They key fault with this 
theory, Rose (1998) argues, is that it does not take into account the fact that a state’s 
perception of a threat is influenced by its relative power and thus cannot explain foreign 
policy without resorting to unit-level variable examinations (p.151). These theories each have 
their own merits, but in the study of sometimes counter-theoretical behaviour in small state 
foreign policy, a theory with a broader focus that incorporates unit-level variables in a realist 
framework is required, which is where neoclassical realism comes in.  
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2.1 Neoclassical Realism  
The main theory that this study draws upon in order to analyse unit-level intervening variables 
that may influence foreign policy is neoclassical realism. For this, I draw primarily upon 
Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (Ripsman et al. 2016), whose comprehensive Neoclassical 
Realist Theory of International Politics outlines the ways in which intervening variables may 
be incorporated into foreign policy analysis.   
Neoclassical realism is based on the initial assumption that “states respond to the 
uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external 
environment” (p.152). That is, they will pursue as much influence as possible given their 
relative power capabilities. Thus, with increasing capabilities comes greater foreign policy 
ambition. However, neoclassical realists argue that it is not solely these system-level variables 
that influence foreign policy; according to them, the impact of system-level variables on 
foreign policy is not direct but is in fact translated through unit-level variables into the mind 
of foreign policy decision-makers, whose decisions are made based not only on external 
considerations, but on internal ones too. Unit-level intervening variables, according to 
Ripsman et al. (2016), can be seen as: 
“the various constraints on the central actors, the interactions within and between decision-
makers and society as a whole, and the processes and mechanisms by which foreign policy is 
formulated, each of which can affect the manner in which states respond to external 
stimuli.” (p.59)  
As such, it is necessary to incorporate unit-level intervening variables into the analysis as 
they can provide greater clarity of the decision-making process at the level of the decision-
maker.  A small number of studies have already been done using both unit- and system-level 
variables to explain the foreign policy of Georgia (Gvalia et al., 2013, 2019) and (Oskanian, 
2016), Armenia (Åberg & Terzyan, 2018), and Azerbaijan (Valiyev & Mamishova, 2019). 
However, as will later be discussed in the literature review, these studies are rather narrow 
in their focus.  
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2.2 Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Outcomes  
The neoclassical realist approach to foreign policy analysis can stipulate a number of potential 
dependent variables (DV), depending on the level of analysis in question. Ripsman et al. 
(2016) argue that the scope of neoclassical realism to explain international outcomes grows 
over time and is not simply a tool to explain individual foreign policy decisions, as had been 
previously thought. As such, they have developed a useful model showing the neoclassical 
realist perception of not only foreign policy, but international politics more broadly.  As 
demonstrated in figure 1.1, system-level stimuli are processed through the foreign policy 
elites (FPE) into policy decisions. The FPE are, during the process, subject to influence from 
other unit-level intervening variables at various points and to varying degrees, and which 
ultimately influence the outcomes of the decision-making process.   
 
Figure 1.1 Neoclassical Realist Model of Foreign Policy (Ripsman et al. 2016, p.81)  
One key aspect of this theory is that foreign policy outcomes can change depending on the 
timescale. For example, in the shorter term (days to months), a country’s relative power is 
unlikely to shift, which means that policy making “consists of navigating the given power 
distribution, without opportunities to augment one’s own power” (p.83). In other words, the 
FPE are faced with crises and other unexpected events that require rapid response and, 
having no time to ameliorate their relative power capabilities, must make decisions based on 
their current abilities. Moreover, with such a constrained timescale, states are generally 
unable to form new alliances or employ necessary pre-emptive balancing strategies to 
respond to the event or crisis in time (p.83).    
As the timescale lengthens, so too does the opportunity for wider variables outside the FPE 
to influence policymaking. When speaking about the short-to-medium term (months to 
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years), states have more flexibility to employ more concrete strategic planning to improve 
their international standing, with their foreign policy becoming “more forward-looking and 
less responsive to fixed conditions and imperatives” (p.83). As such, states, building on their 
existing resources, can develop themselves further economically and militarily, as well as 
establish alliances with other powers (p.84).   
Going further still, in the medium-to-long term (years to decades), we begin to see the impact 
of the strategic planning employed by states interacting to produce systemic outcomes 
internationally, by which Ripsman et al. mean the “observable political phenomena resulting 
from the coaction and interactions of the strategies pursued by two or more actors in the 
international arena” (p.85). Thus, at this timescale we start to see the results of the interplay 
of different countries’ foreign policy strategies.    
In the long term (decades), the international system itself can be influenced by the policies 
and grand strategies of its constituent units because, according to Ripsman et al. 2016, 
“systemic outcomes can alter systemic structure by weakening existing powers and/or 
generating new ones” (p.86). Moreover, while structural realists agree that the differential 
growth rates of great powers are the main cause of structural change, their rate of growth is 
“largely determined by the strategic economic and political choices [they] make over time as 
part of their foreign policy and grand strategic planning” (pp.86-87).   
2.3 Independent Variable: The International System & Relative Power 
Capabilities 
In this neoclassical realist study of foreign policy, the key independent variable (IV) is the 
international system and the state’s relative power capabilities. Ripsman et al. (2016) discuss 
the ways in which these factors are the primary causal influence on a state’s foreign policy, 
which they see as the main factors limiting (or expanding) possible policy directions. Because 
the condition of the system at any one time may determine how one state interacts with that 
system, at this level of analysis it is necessary to examine system-level dynamics such as the 
propensity for other systemic stimuli to exert influence on a nation state’s foreign policy.  
Defining the international system has often presented an issue in international relations, since 
the way one defines it can have theoretical implications. For the purposes of this study, 
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however, I shall use the definition outlined by Ripsman et al (2016), who define it as state-
centric, focussing primarily on the actions of state actors. Historically speaking, they define it 
as:  
“the interstate system that emerged in Western Europe during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries and that by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries… had 
grown into a single global international system subsuming previously autonomous systems” 
(Ripsman et al., 2016, p.35). 
Drawing on Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) conception of structural realist theory, Ripsman et al. 
(2016) outline two important ways in which neoclassical realism draws on Waltz’s original 
idea. The first is that while the international system can impose constraints on its units by 
providing a number of potential strategic options and outcomes, the international system 
alone cannot determine the precise behaviour of its units (p.36). The second is that the 
anarchic nature of the international system creates uncertainty among the units (p.37). In 
other words, the international system – primarily the “relative distribution of material 
capabilities and anticipated power trends” – sets the broad parameters for the ways in 
which states can behave, but its influence on states’ actual external behaviour is “complex 
and indirect” (p.37).  Moreover, according to Waltz, the international system is by its nature 
anarchic, as opposed to hierarchic, since, rather than being one large hierarchy or empire 
with one actor or unit above all others, the modern international system is composed of 
“like units co-acting”, with each performing the same tasks without specialising, as opposed 
to each specialising as a part of a much larger entity (Waltz, 1979, p. 18).  
Neoclassical realism builds on this anarchic system foundation but makes one important 
change – it acknowledges that there are other variables on both the systemic and unit level 
of analysis, while accepting that the main explanatory variables are the relative distribution 
of power and power trends, which “are conditioned by structural modifiers” (Ripsman et al., 
2016, p.43). Drawing on the term “structural modifiers”, coined by Glenn Snyder, which 
includes such factors as geography or “the rates of technological diffusion”, they concede 
that these factors “can modify the effect of the system’s structure… [on] the likely external 
behaviours of individual units.” (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.40).  These structural modifiers can 
create constraints or opportunities for certain states, but given the unique way in which, for 
example, a state’s geostrategic location will provide it with opportunity or constraint, these 
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will not apply to the system as a whole but rather to particular states or regions (Ripsman et 
al., 2016, pp. 41-42). It is thus the international system, in particular the relative distribution 
of power and power trends within the system, that sets the parameters for states to 
conduct their foreign policy by determining the choices available to them. The relative 
distribution of power in the international system can be measured, according to neoclassical 
realists, by “various measurements or indicators of a state’s material capabilities”, such as 
its gross domestic product (GDP); its level of defence spending (as a percentage of GDP); the 
size of its armed forces; the size of its population; its natural resources; and the size of its 
territory (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.44).    
Other important concepts stem from the relative distribution of power. The first is polarity, 
which “denote[s] the number of great powers or major states in existence within a system 
at a given time” and “their control over sufficient material components of power as well as 
the political and bureaucratic means to extract and mobilize these resources” (Ripsman et 
al. 2016, p.45). The international system may approximate to one of three ideal types at any 
given time: unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. The polarity in the system, according to Ripsman 
et al. (2016), “is a function of the relative distribution of capabilities among the major states 
in the system” (p.45) and is thus an inevitable by-product of the system.  
However, Ripsman et al. go on to mention that it is not only the polarity of the system that 
is important, but also the “clarity” with which foreign policy decision-makers perceive the 
polarity of the system.  As a key systemic variable for neoclassical realist analysis of foreign 
policy, they identify three components of clarity which can significantly impact of a state’s 
foreign policy decisions:  
• “The degree to which threats and opportunities are readily discernible; 
• Whether the system provides information on the time horizons of threats and 
opportunities;  
• Whether optimal policy options stand out or not” (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.46) 
These factors can greatly limit the number of choices available to states – greater clarity of 
the threats posed by other states and the time-frame of potential action, as well as possible 
options should mean that the number of possible options open to a state should be few, 
whereas poor clarity of threats means that the number of options should be higher and 
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open to interpretation (Ripsman et al., 2016, pp. 49-50). However, while the international 
system and material power capabilities, as well as the clarity of threats and opportunities, 
and polarity of the system greatly limit the number of choices open to states, it is through 
other unit-level ‘intervening variables’ that we can greater understand the ways in which 
these systemic factors are translated into actual policy.  
2.4 Incorporating unit-level intervening variables 
According to Rose (1998), neoclassical realists argue that while a state’s foreign policy is 
governed primarily by factors at the systemic level of analysis, these systemic level factors 
must be “translated through intervening variables at the unit level” (p.146). In other words, 
domestic factors, or unit-level variables, must be taken into account when analysing foreign 
policy because these affect the ways in which foreign policy decision-makers understand and 
respond to issues in the international system. Furthermore, according to Taliaferro (2006), 
neoclassical realism differs from neorealism because where the latter looks for patters in 
international politics, the former looks to explain why individual states’ foreign policies differ 
over time, or when two states’ foreign policies differ when they face similar external 
constraints (p.480). Neoclassical realism thus reconciles unit-level variables with systemic 
theories of international relations and provides a clearer account of foreign policy decision-
making. Valerie Hudson (2014) confirms the necessity of examining variables on both levels 
of analysis in her book on foreign policy analysis:  
“a foreign policy analyst would be remiss in dismissing these theories of more macrolevel 
attributes of nations and systems. Clearly these things affect foreign policy choice. To 
achieve its explanatory objectives, FPA [Foreign Policy Analysis] must examine all levels of 
analysis for possible impact on foreign policy choice.” (p.162) 
Therefore, when conducting a neoclassical realist comparison of the states of the South 
Caucasus, it is necessary to include intervening variables that have the potential to influence 
foreign policy in a number of ways. The utility in using neoclassical realism for analysing 
foreign policy in the South Caucasus has already been proven in a number of studies. In order 
to examine what exactly influences foreign policy in the South Caucasus through the lenses 
of neoclassical realism, it is necessary to conceptualise the types of intervening variables (IVV) 
to take into account. In response to criticism that neoclassical realist studies select their cases 
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in an eclectic and ad-hoc manner and can, therefore, only apply to specific foreign policy 
situations (pp. 59-60), Ripsman et al. (2016) conceptualised four types of intervening variables 
(see figure 1.1 above), which I have backed up in this study with similar conceptualisations by  
Valerie Hudson (2014) and Randall Schweller (2006), and discuss the impact they could 
potentially have on foreign policy decision-making: elite preferences; strategic culture; state-
society relations; and domestic institutions.    
2.4.1 Elite Preferences  
The first type of intervening variable, drawing on a type defined by Ripsman et al. (2016) as 
“leader images”, which they define as the beliefs or images of individuals in the foreign policy 
executive (FPE), including key decision-makers in foreign policy such as the “president, prime 
minister, or dictator, and key cabinet members, ministers, and advisors charged with the 
conduct of foreign and defense policies” (p.61). However, examination of these kinds of 
variables requires and in-depth psychological analysis of key decision-makers, their 
personalities, previous experiences, beliefs, and values – cognitive filters through which they 
perceive the outside world (p.61). Therefore, for the purposes of this study, this kind of IVV 
has been restructured as “elite preferences”. That is, the vested interests held by the FPE both 
internationally and domestically that can influence their foreign policy decision-making. Such 
variables can include, for example, business interests and regime security – factors that may 
drive the FPE to make certain decisions, which are made in their own interests but not 
necessarily in the interests of broader society.     
According to Ripsman et al. (2016), these kinds of variables “should matter most in the short 
term” because in times of crisis most other actors with the potential to influence policy are 
excluded from the process (p.91). Conversely, when the timescale is greater, it is expected 
that elite preferences will play a less important role in decision-making because other actors 
are brought into the process “to contribute to defining problems and devising policy 
solutions” (p.91).    
This approach is also emphasised by Hudson (2014), who also mentions the importance of an 
FPE’s actual interest in foreign policy, and thus how likely they are to delegate their authority 
in the foreign policy decision-making process to subordinates, in which case it would be 
required to examine the subordinates as well (p.40). In addition, an FPE’s interest and 
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involvement in foreign policymaking may vary over time, from low during peacetime to high 
in times of conflict or crisis (p.40). Another dynamic outlined by Hudson is the role of group 
dynamics in the decision-making process, in particular small groups. She states that groups 
will behave differently depending on the power of the leader, as well as the role that 
members of the group consider themselves to be playing, i.e. whether they are loyal to the 
leader’s views, representing a certain part of the government bureaucracy (e.g. the security 
services, military etc.), or whether they are acting autonomously, representing their own 
beliefs and preferences (p.74).   
One measurement criteria discussed by Schweller (2006) is that of “elite cohesion”, which he 
defines as “the degree to which a central government’s political leadership is fragmented by 
persistent internal divisions” (p.54). In this way, more-cohesive governments will more likely 
be able to conduct an effective balancing strategy as they face less internal division or 
resistance from other elites (p.55). However, if elites are fragmented, they will be far less 
likely to be able to pursue a balancing strategy in the face of a threat. Balancing a threat is 
difficult and requires the mobilisation of societal resources (for example, higher taxation for 
higher defence spending), and in no way will be accepted by other elites unless there is a high 
degree of cohesion (p.55).  
2.4.2 Strategic Culture 
Another type of intervening variable outlined by Ripsman et al. is “strategic culture”. Strategic 
culture can concern the “organisational culture” of a government bureaucracy on the one 
hand or, more generally, widespread societal norms, such as the beliefs and expectations of 
wider society and their attitudes towards others, on the other (Ripsman et al. 2016, p.63). 
These in turn can influence foreign policymaking in that they “constrain a state’s behaviour 
and freedom of action by defining what are acceptable and unacceptable strategic choices” 
(p.64). In other words, the FPEs will be limited in their foreign policy choices to those that 
comply with the wider the strategic culture, or else face a backlash. Furthermore, the 
dominant ideology of a state could be included in strategic culture, in that it affects a country’s 
perceptions of, and attitudes towards, other countries and the international system, as well 
as limiting acceptable policy option (p.65).  
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Ripsman et al. (2016) predict that strategic culture will be influential over both the short and 
the long term. In a day-to-day situation, it can constrain the number of options the FPE have, 
particularly in terms of “national attitudes towards the use of force” (pp. 91-92). In the longer 
term, strategic culture can exert significant influence over the FPE and its long-term foreign 
policy strategies because, in case the FPE have not already been “inculcated with national 
attitudes”, the FPE will seek to avoid building societal opposition towards their strategy by 
going against national values and attitudes (p.92).  
Similarly, Hudson (2014) also discusses the role of culture and national identity in foreign 
policymaking.  On a fundamental level, when trying to define ‘culture’, she identifies the role 
of ‘shared meaning’ between decision-makers of a certain country, and thus how their 
country or people should behave in relation to others. However, such a study of the impact 
of culture on foreign policymaking would require an in-depth analysis of specific cultural 
norms and the way they influence the psychology of a person, as well as how that may lead 
them to take certain decisions in foreign policy and, according to Hudson, may not be very 
worthwhile unless examining a “totalitarian microculture” (p.136).  
2.4.3 State-Society Relations 
State-society relations as a type of intervening variable involves examining the “character of 
interactions between the central institutions of the state and various economic and or societal 
groups” (Ripsman et al. 2016, p.66). Included among such variables are the level of cohesion 
fragmentation of the government and society, the level of opposition a government faces in 
society (p.66), as well as regime vulnerability, all of which can have a large impact on foreign 
policymaking. These factors influence the government’s ability to extract resources from the 
population and harness the country’s potential and, therefore, the government’s freedom to 
conduct foreign policy according to its preferences (p.66). In this sense, corruption may be a 
particularly influential factor, as widespread corruption can strongly hinder a government’s 
ability to extract its country’s resources. Moreover, the higher the cohesion between 
government and society, and the more satisfied society is with the government’s 
performance, the greater freedom the government will have to respond to systemic issues. 
However, maintaining good state-society relations may also result in foreign policy that 
“satisfies domestic interest, rather than exclusively international ones” (p.67) as well as lead 
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to under-balancing a potential threat if the government must take into account the interests 
of powerful societal actors (p.68). When state-society relations are sub-optimal, the 
government may have to spend considerably more resources to extract what it needs from 
society (p.67). As such, an unpopular regime may not only face domestic opposition, but may 
be threatened with losing an election, or worse being ousted in a coup or revolution if it fails 
to meet society’s demands.  
In terms of timescale, Ripsman et al. (2016) would expect state-society relations to be more 
influential over the long-term since, in the short-term, “the exigencies of a crisis or quick 
decision place disproportionate power in the hands of the leader to shape the national 
response” (p.93). However, over a longer timescale, important societal actors will have 
greater opportunity to shape policy according to their interests and preferences (p.93). Thus, 
societal actors will have more influence on the grand strategies of the FPE than on quick 
decision-making.    
Schweller (2006) also identifies some measurement criteria that could come under state-
society relations, the first of which is “government/regime vulnerability”. This concerns the 
challenges the governing regime faces from other actors in society, such as the military, 
political opposition, or societal actors, and the risk of losing its power through either elections 
or other means (p.49). Similar to Ripsman et al.’s (2016) variable discussed above, FPEs that 
are particularly vulnerable often cannot pursue their foreign policy preferences to the same 
degree as their safer counterparts in other countries because they must pay more attention 
to satisfying the preferences of other actors that challenge their power. Moreover, they will 
be unable to mobilise the resources they need from government and society to pursue a 
costly or risky balancing strategy at the expense of other actors’ preferences should the need 
arise (p.50). 
Schweller’s second state-society relations measurement criteria is “social cohesion”. A key 
aspect of this variable is the legitimacy that society places on the ruling government/regime; 
if the society accepts the legitimacy of the ruling elite, it will be less likely to oppose, or at 
least act against, the policies pursued by the ruling elite (p.51). Social cohesion is more likely 
in states where society feels interconnected and where there are mechanisms to solve 
internal disputes. Moreover, the existence of an outside threat can lead to greater social 
cohesion due to a “rally round the flag effect” that mobilises the population against a common 
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threat (p.51). However, this may not always be the case. Different groups in society who are 
already competing with each other may not simply drop their differences for the common 
good; according to Simmel (1955) “A state of conflict… pulls the members of so tightly 
together and subjects them to such uniform impulse that they either must get completely 
along with, or completely repel, one another” (pp. 87-88). As such, the use of conflict with an 
external threat to increase internal societal cohesion should only be used as a last resort (pp. 
87-88). 
2.4.4 Domestic Institutions  
The final type of intervening variable discussed by Ripsman et al. (2016) concerns the role of 
domestic institutions. According to them, formal domestic institutions, such as the 
parliament, judiciary, civil service etc. have the power to influence policy by reshaping or even 
blocking government policies they do not agree with. Consequently, the institutional 
structure of a state, including the power allotted to each institution, can play a role in foreign 
policymaking (p.69). Equally, it is important to note the degree to which political power is 
concentrated in the hands of the executive and the institutional constraints placed on them 
as these factors determine the executives’ ability to harness the country’s power and thus to 
respond to events in the international environment (p.70). 
In her discussion of domestic political institutions, Hudson (2014) also makes the point that 
domestic institutions can set the political agenda, as well as introduce checks and balances, 
such as veto powers, judicial reviews, and supermajorities (p.143). While these kinds of 
domestic political issues can make the implementation of foreign policy more complex and 
time-consuming, they can also serve to improve the bargaining power of both the 
government (when negotiating in the international system) and domestic players (when 
negotiating with a government that requires their support) (pp. 142-143). Furthermore, 
Hudson (2014) emphasises that in order to understand where international factors influence 
foreign policymaking, it is first necessary to understand the domestic “game board” or 
political landscape and the role domestic factors have in the policymaking process. After 
doing so, one should be able to see where and how, if at all, international factors fit into the 
process (p.145). 
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2.5 Connecting the Independent, Dependent, and Intervening Variables  
In their attempt to demonstrate neoclassical realism, not only as a theory of foreign policy 
but as an all-encompassing theory of international politics, Ripsman et al. (2016) have shown 
that the scope of neoclassical realism for analysis develops over time. In the short term, it has 
the power to explain the causes and results of FPE’s decision-making in response to system-
level events or crises, while in the longer term it can ultimately explain the system-level 
outcomes of states’ grand strategies developed over the course of decades. However, the 
different types of intervening variables will be more or less likely to be influential on foreign 
policy depending on the timescale involved. The elite preferences IVVs, for example, are more 
likely to play a larger role in foreign policymaking in the short term because in certain 
situations, such as a crisis, when rapid decision-making is necessary, leaders exclude other 
societal actors from the process (p.91). In such situations, the role of the FPE is enhanced, as 
it is almost exclusively they who make decisions, and thus leader image-type variables have 
the potential to be more influential. On the other hand, when the FPE is not so constrained 
by time, other societal actors can be brought into the decision-making process, as leaders can 
afford to take the time to consult them (P.91). Thus, as the timescale increases, so too does 
the potential influence of actors further removed from the FPE.  
Neoclassical realism’s independent variable (systemic stimuli and relative power capabilities) 
has the effect of significantly narrowing down the choices available to states in the 
international system. Because states are bound by such systemic factors as geography and 
relative power, for example, they must navigate themselves within the boundaries raised by 
these factors. Moreover, the polarity of the international system, combined with the clarity 
of threats, opportunities, their timescales, as well as the possible policy directions stemming 
from these are important when it comes to foreign policy decision-making. However, 
neoclassical realism stipulates that although these factors govern the broad direction a state’s 
foreign policy will take, they alone cannot account for the particular decisions made by a 
country’s FPE and, as such, unit-level intervening variables must be examined to determine 
the precise causes and outcomes of foreign policymaking.  
When analysing foreign policy according to a neoclassical realist theoretical framework, it is 
necessary to examine a number of different types of intervening unit-level variables that have 
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the potential to influence foreign policy decision-makers ability to mobilise the state’s 
resources. These variables can guide the policy choices of the elite to varying degrees, 
depending on the power they have over decision-making process. Thus, at all levels of society, 
unit-level intervening variables have the potential to influence foreign policy in various 
situations. 
Having conceptualised the systemic stimuli, intervening variables, and foreign policy 
outcomes, should help to categorise and explain numerous different factors that influence 
foreign policy in the South Caucasus, which will be discussed in due course. However, while 
this theory discusses the primary role of great powers and their long-term strategies in 
influencing the international system over time, it does pose the question of where small 
states fit into the system, and what role they play. For the purposes of this study, which 
focuses primarily on the foreign policy of small states and not great powers, and the fact that 
the time scale of particular foreign policy outcomes (as opposed to grand strategies) tends to 
be in the scale of days to years, it thus befalls this study to examine key decisions and their 
outcomes that occur over a short-to-medium term timescale of days to years. As Ripsman et 
al. (2016) note:    
“In the short-to-medium term… states must act within a given international structure, which 
constrains their foreign policy and grand strategic choice, as well as the range of likely 
international systemic outcomes” (p.90) 
Moreover, as small states are generally bound by the systemic interactions of great powers 
in the system and their much larger neighbours (in the case of the states of the South 
Caucasus), it would require a much greater analysis with the scope of decades to properly 
examine the systemic impact of the “grand strategies” of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 
Thus, in this study we shall focus primarily on short-to-medium timescale foreign policy 
outcomes. One important issue with the neoclassical realist theoretical framework laid out 
above is that it focuses primarily on the role of great powers and less on the role of small 
states. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan can be considered small states by most measures 
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), population size, military spending etc. Conventional 
neorealist wisdom has maintained that due to the nature of small states, the international 
system is almost always the most important influence on small states’ foreign policy due to 
the systemic constraints placed upon them by larger and more powerful states, such as 
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opportunities for alliance formation and hostility of neighbouring larger states, because of 
which, therefore, small state foreign policy should be entirely predictable (Elman, 1995, p. 
179). Furthermore, Elman (1995) notes that the received opinion in foreign policy scholarship 
is that it is difficult to use constructivist theories to explain small state foreign policy 
outcomes, while realist theories hold much greater explanatory power in this regard. As such, 
neoclassical realism should have more utility in small state foreign policy analysis due to its 
fundamental predictions of the overall importance of systemic stimuli (a prediction shared by 
previous foreign policy scholarship), while allowing a greater degree of flexibility thanks to its 
ability to examine unit-level variables as well.   
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3 Literature Review 
Much has been written already on the subject of foreign policy in the South Caucasus. Each 
country, in its own way, provides a unique example of many kinds of state behaviour and is 
subject to many types of influences not found in larger countries. Being three small countries 
of the same region and thus bound by similar geographic and systemic constraints, at first 
glance one could imagine they would react to external events in similar ways, given the 
systemic constraints they face. However, existing literature has shown that this is not 
necessarily the case, and each state’s foreign policy is bound not only by external realities, 
but also by domestic processes within the states themselves, as will be explained. 
3.1 Georgia 
Much research has already taken place on the subject of Georgian foreign policy. Georgia 
itself has proved to be a very interesting case in foreign policy study due to its seemingly 
contradictory orientation in theoretical terms. In particular, Georgia has been the focus of a 
number of studies, each identifying different variables that could be the main cause of 
Georgia’s foreign policy choices. Firstly, the main articles I draw upon for this thesis concern 
primarily neoclassical realist approaches to foreign due to their relevance to the present 
study.  
The first main study I draw upon is Gvalia, Siroky, Lebanidze & Iashvili (Gvalia et al. 2013). This 
study seeks to explain Georgia’s foreign policy in terms of elite ideas about the identity and 
purpose of the state as an attempt to explain the discrepancies between the way in which 
Georgia would be predicted to according to structural realist and materialist theory, and 
Georgia’s geopolitical orientation in reality. They first identify a number of ways in which ideas 
can influence foreign policy: perception of external threats, framing of options and outcomes, 
ideas as constraints in the foreign policy decision-making process, and consistency in decision-
making (p.109). These then serve to suggest that ideas and ideology are key intervening 
variables in the foreign policy decision-making process and are thus the main reason why 
Georgia has continued it attempts to integrate further with Euro-Atlantic institutions and 
rejects a path that would take it into Russian-dominated institutions. However, a key 
drawback of this study is that it is quite narrow, focusing primarily on the tenure of one 
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government over two periods of foreign policy, as well as taking the view that Georgia’s pro-
western orientation started after the Rose Revolution, when in reality it began during the 
Shevardnadze period. Although in all fairness, this course did dramatically pick up the pace 
after the revolution.  
A study by Kevork Oskanian (2016) sought to use neoclassical realism to explain Georgian 
foreign policy between 1992 and 2014. However, in contrast the earlier study by Gvalia et al. 
(2013), Oskanian identifies that Georgia’s pro-western orientation had already begun under 
Shevardnadze’s leadership and that it merely sped up under Saakashvili. Consequently, 
Oskanian comes to the conclusion that it was in fact the Georgian leadership’s perceptions of 
decreasing Russian power, combined with increasing western power and commitment in the 
region, that led it to pursue a much stronger pro-western foreign policy that it otherwise 
would have. In addition, Oskanian notes that it was this miscalculation on the part of Georgia 
that also led it to try to regain control over the secessionist region of South Ossetia, which 
culminated in the 2008 war that was disastrous for Georgia. Moreover, in the aftermath of 
the war, the Saakashvili government’s dependence on its pro-western ideology meant that 
Georgia was unable to reconcile with Russia in any meaningful way until the replacement of 
Saakashvili’s government by the Georgian Dream (p.632). 
In a more recent study, Gvalia, Lebanidze & Siroky (Gvalia et al. 2019) seek to explain Georgian 
foreign policy behaviour by examining the influence of the unit-level factors of elite cohesion 
and state capacity. Using a neoclassical realist framework, they examine Georgian foreign 
policy between two period – before and after the Rose Revolution. They identify that the 
dramatic increase in state capacity developed by the new reformist government of 
Saakashvili, combined with a high degree of consensus among the elite, have enabled Georgia 
to more robustly pursue its western integration ambitions. Moreover, in contrast to their 
earlier study, (Gvalia et al. 2013) they find that it was not only the strength of the pro-western 
ideology of the government itself that led to effective foreign policy, but the significant 
improvement and development of the state institutions and state capacity that gave decision-
makers the resources they needed to do it (pp. 41-42).  
The latter two studies have been crucial in demonstrating the applicability of the neoclassical 
realist theory for analysis of the foreign policy of Georgia, which therefore provide an 
invaluable basis on which to conduct further study. Of course, there have been a number of 
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other, non-neoclassical realist studies of Georgia to determine the key variables that influence 
its foreign policy. One such recent example is by Kakachia, Minesashvili & Kakhishvili 
(Kakachia et al. 2018), which examines the role of identity in foreign policymaking. Using a 
social constructivist theoretical framework, they find that the way Georgian politicians view 
the country and its capabilities influences their perceptions of how foreign policy should be 
conducted. By analysing the political discourse of elites from different political parties (the 
United National Movement and the Georgian Dream), they discovered that their perceptions 
of the international environment determine the way they view the role of Georgia itself in the 
world, and thus how it should act on the world stage. Kakachia et al. see this as a key variable 
that changed Georgia’s foreign policy after the change of government in 2013.                  
The curious case of Georgia’s foreign policy over time has, it seems, become a useful training 
ground for foreign policy analysts to test their theories. It is clear that in such a small state, 
bound by the international environment and dominated by its much larger neighbour to the 
north, neoclassical realism offers the best framework for analysis, particularly for Georgia. 
However, all of these studies seem to focus specifically on elite ideas and their influence on 
foreign policy. Moreover, while Gvalia et al. (2019) also identify state capacity as a key 
intervening variable, there is still as lack of research into other unit-level variables, such as 
societal cohesion and regime stability, and the effects these may have on foreign policy.  
3.2 Armenia  
Armenian foreign policy has been the topic of much discussion in both English and Russian 
language academia, and as such, I have tried to draw on Russian language publications to 
offer greater insight into non-western perceptions of Armenian foreign policy. 
The first key study I draw upon is by John H.S. Åberg & Aram Terzyan (2018), examines 
Armenian foreign policy since independence to explain its foreign policy choices. Seeking to 
refute the common belief that Armenia’s pro-Russian orientation is merely the result of 
“Armenia’s geographical location and material weakness” (p.151), Åberg and Terzyan identify 
that “structural”, “dispositional”, and “intentional” dimensions are key variables that have 
influenced Armenian foreign policy since its independence. Regarding the first president, 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan, they note that his pragmatic approach towards foreign policy saw 
Armenia trying not to become overly dependent on Russia for security, believing that Armenia 
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would have to make concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh (p.157). However, his strategy was 
cut short by oppositionists in Armenia in favour the Karabakhi pro-Russian Robert Kocharyan. 
Having learnt from his predecessor’s mistakes, Kocharyan’s rigidity in not compromising over 
Karabakh and deepening the strategic relationship with Russia. The assassination of the two 
key power holders left Kocharyan as the core policymaker, at which time he shifted to a pro-
Russian foreign policy (p.161). Åberg and Terzyan go on to say this was due to Kocharyan 
seeking stability and security for his regime in a time of colour revolutions in post-Soviet 
countries, as well as improving relations between Russia and Azerbaijan (pp. 161-162). 
Moreover, they argue that Kocharyan’s personal position on Karabakh could have come from 
the fact that he was its president for a time, and his role in the conflict undoubtedly influenced 
his approach to the conflict (p.163). In terms of Serzh Sargsyan’s presidency, the authors offer 
an explanation of his decision to reject the EU’s Association Agreement in favour of EAEU 
membership as the absence of any EU security guarantees, combined with the EU’s lack of 
influence on Azerbaijan’s behaviour forced Armenia to accept the Russian offer (p.168). The 
ideational factors behind this decision, they note, were that Sargsyan had hardened his 
rhetoric against Turkey after the failed “football diplomacy”, the reinforced perception of 
Russia as Armenia’s saviour, and Sargsyan’s regime security in light of the recent Euromaidan 
events in Ukraine (pp.168-169). The key findings of this study were that the cases in which 
system-level factors appear to influence foreign policy, but where in reality there are often 
unit-level variables, in this case the ideational preferences of the lead decision-maker of 
Armenian foreign policy, which have the power to influence policy decisions.   
Taline Papazian (2006) discusses the phenomenon of continuity rather than change in 
Armenia foreign policy between 1991 and 2003. She examined why Armenian foreign policy 
had continued with minimal changes, despite a complete change in leadership in 1998 from 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan to Robert Kocharyan, both of whom have different backgrounds 
(intellectual vs military). In order to find out why, she examined the decision-making process 
and political elites, as opposed simply to the international environment. She discovered that 
the unchanging nature of the Armenia’s problems, a lack of funds, as well as caution rather 
than ambition on the part of the leadership, have meant that Armenia has a very limited 
number of choices when it comes to foreign policy. As a result, a change in leadership has had 
no effect on foreign policy conditions. Indeed, she claims, “it is foreign policy that weighs 
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more on Armenia’s foreign policy” than vice versa (p.236). Despite her examination of 
domestic factors, she found that Nagorno-Karabakh, throughout the period in question, has 
been the main concern of foreign policy decision-makers.  
Another study, conducted by Michael Kambeck (2014), sought to explain Armenian foreign 
policy choices in the wake of the September 2013 decision by Serzh Sarsgsyan not sign an 
Association Agreement with the EU, but instead join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic 
Union. Kambeck identifies the idea of complementarity, wherein Armenia seeks the best 
possible relations with as many partners as it can, often relying on its diaspora for essential 
connections to its main partners in Russia, Europe and the United States. However, this 
complementary foreign policy can sometimes come into conflict when Armenia must choose 
between the West and Russia, an example of which being the decision to forsake the 
Association Agreement with the EU for the Russian dominated customs union. As a result, 
since the disputes between Russia and the western powers are beyond Armenia’s control, 
Armenia should focus on maintaining positive relations with both sides. Moreover, Kambeck 
notes that Armenian foreign policy did not in fact change after the 2013 decision, but it was 
a reflection of Armenia continuing to address its primary goals of improving its security and 
economic situation (p.36).  
An article by V.K. Atoyan (2015) examined the main processes of Armenian foreign policy and 
its priorities. Atoyan identifies that since its independence, Armenia’s foreign policy has been 
based on two fundamental principles: complementarity (as mentioned above) and 
involvement (p.97). Based on these principles, as well as its strategic alliance with Russia, 
Armenia seeks to conduct a multi-vectored foreign policy, taking into account risks to its 
security, and cooperating wherever possible with all powers in the region (p.99-100). In terms 
of the main influences on foreign policy, Atoyan discusses the exceptional role of the diaspora 
as a form of soft power acting in Armenian interests in other countries, as well as preventing 
Azerbaijan from monopolising relations with the West and using them against Armenia 
(p.100). Furthermore, Atoyan refers to the strategic partnership between Armenia and 
Russia, in the face of the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance, being a cornerstone of Armenian foreign 
policy. In particular, he identifies Armenia’s dependence on Russian energy resources, Russian 
capital in the Armenian economy, the size of the Armenian diaspora in Russia, and the 
traditional links and friendly relations with Russia as the key factors in the relationship (p.104). 
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These relations were raised to a new level with Armenia’s accession into the EAEU, which 
gave clarity to (p.114). As such, Atoyan comes to the conclusion that Armenian foreign policy 
is first and foremost about security, and the best way to ensure stability is to maintain and 
develop its relationship with Russia. However, this deepening of relations in no way means a 
reduction of the economic importance of the EU for Armenia. Thus, Armenia can maintain its 
security while continuing economic and humanitarian cooperation with the EU (p.117).   
Overall, the common denominator between studies of Armenian foreign policy appear to be 
that the key features involve security and diversifying Armenia’s relations with as many other 
actors as possible. This confirms the applicability of neorealist approaches to studies of 
Armenian foreign policy. Moreover, Åberg & Terzyan (2018) emphasise the influence of unit-
level variables in their study of the personal preferences of Armenian presidents over time, 
also confirming that neoclassical realism can be a useful tool is examining the foreign policy 
of states seemingly bound supremely by external factors. However, similarly to previous 
research about Georgian foreign policy, there is a lack of research on different unit-level 
variables, with the exception of Åberg & Terzyan (2018), and the role of other domestic 
factors have not been throughly researched.         
3.3 Azerbaijan 
In addition to its western neighbours, Azerbaijan too has a unique foreign policy strategy that 
has been the subject of much foreign policy literature over the years. One key recent study 
by Anar Valiyev and Narmina Mamishova (2019) examines Azerbaijan’s foreign policy towards 
Russia since its independence. Using a neorealist and neoclassical realist theoretical 
framework, they identify that Azerbaijan has pursued a foreign policy towards that they 
describe as “strategic hedging”, a middle ground between completely balancing against, and 
bandwagoning with, Russia. In this way, Azerbaijan has been able to maintain a strong 
relationship with Russia, while also being able to pursue its own oil-driven interests with the 
rest of the world. This “strategic hedging” policy, developed under the presidency of Heydar 
Aliyev and continued under by his son Ilham Aliyev, has sought to learn from the inconsistent 
policies of their predecessors and form a balanced middle way that also satisfies Russia’s 
interests. Moreover, Valiyev and Mamishova note that two key moments of change in 
Azerbaijan-Russia relations, namely the change of presidency between Boris Yeltsin and 
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Vladimir Putin in 2000, and a shift following the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, whereby Russia 
re-established itself as the dominant power in the South Caucasus, were indeed not caused 
by Azerbaijan, but by Russia (pp. 287-288). By accepting Russia’s dominant position in the 
region, Azerbaijan has thus sought to accommodate Russia’s interests and does not seek to 
provoke Russia by pursuing ambitious western integration projects in the way Georgia has 
done. In addition, Valiyev and Mamishova emphasis the applicability of neoclassical realism 
in explaining Azerbaijan’s foreign policy due to its contradiction of neorealist predictions. In 
this sense, a country in Azerbaijan’s position would be expected to bandwagon with Russia in 
light of its more aggressive, expansionist foreign policy since 2008. On the contrary, Valiyev 
and Mamishova identify that the huge oil and gas reserves have given the Azerbaijani elite 
more confidence in their foreign policy, which has allowed Azerbaijan to maintain and pursue 
its non-bloc identity (pp. 285-286).    
Another useful study of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy to draw upon as been by Eske Van Gils 
(2018), which looks at Azerbaijan’s relations with the European Union. By examining two key 
areas where Azerbaijan and the EU do not agree, namely democracy and human rights, and 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, she has been able to identify the strategies used by the two 
parties to gain more out of their negotiations. On the one hand, the EU sees itself as a strong 
promoter of the values of democracy and human rights (DHR), and these policies are based 
largely on its perceived role in promoting these norms. Moreover, regarding Nagorno-
Karabakh, the EU stresses the role of the OSCE in the resolution of the conflict yet struggles 
to reconcile its ‘supporting actor’ role in the conflict with its role as a regional security actor 
(p.753). On the other hand, Van Gils finds that Azerbaijan’s priorities in its relations with the 
EU are its national independence, its balancing strategy, and the legitimacy of its regime 
(p.753). However, in order to examine the effects of the EU’s and Azerbaijan’s priorities on 
their relations, Van Gils finds they use proactive and reactive strategies by which they 
promote their own priorities while resisting those of their counterpart. Interestingly, Van Gils 
finds that the EU’s values-based approach to its relations with Azerbaijan is a frequent cause 
of tension in the relationship, as Azerbaijan perceives the EU’s promotion of human rights as 
interference in Azerbaijan’s domestic politics and threatens the legitimacy of its regime. In 
response, Azerbaijan counters these tactics by limiting exposure of human rights violations in 
the media while highlighting Azerbaijan’s economic and political independence (p.745). On 
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the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan’s proactive strategy to get the EU more involved 
in the resolution of the conflict puts pressure on the EU, which cooperates with both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan through the Eastern Partnership. These difficulties are made worse by the EU’s 
insistence on the role of the OSCE Minsk Group in the conflict resolution, the chairs of which 
(US, France, Russia) Azerbaijan perceives to be biased in favour of Armenia (de Waal, 2010, 
pp. 104-105). Therefore, Azerbaijan seeks for the EU play a more active role in its support for 
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity (p.749). She concludes that the EU and Azerbaijan can resist 
the others proactive strategies using reactive strategies, the ultimate result of which is that it 
is “easier to defend the status quo than to bring about reform” (p.753).  
Current literature on the foreign policy of Azerbaijan has been very insightful in its 
descriptions and explanations of its foreign policy. Indeed, the concept of strategic hedging 
has been very useful, and their use of neoclassical realism adds further weight to their 
arguments. However, the main criticism of Valiyev & Mamishova’s (2019) study is that it is 
somewhat narrowly focused on Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia and does not offer in-depth 
explanations of its behaviour vis-à-vis other countries. Moreover, it does not examine the role 
of other domestic factors such as ideational influences on key decision-makers. Regarding 
Van Gils’s (2018) study of Azerbaijan-EU relations, she examines primarily their strategies for 
dealing with one another without considering too much the role of other variables in 
Azerbaijani foreign policy, in particular the role of Russia, which especially recently has 
changed Azerbaijan’s approach to its relations with other powers.     
3.4 Additional Literature  
In addition to the country specific studies mentioned above, a number of other studies discuss 
the serious geopolitical issues facing the South Caucasus. One such study, by Souleimanov, 
Abrahamyan and Aliyev (2018) discussed the influence of Russian coercive diplomacy utilising 
unrecognised states in the South Caucasus, namely South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to 
them, Russian has sought to maintain its proactive role as peacekeeper in the secessionist 
conflicts in the region because it sees the dependency of the unrecognised states on Russia 
as a “core precondition for Russia’s long-term influence on its post-Soviet neighbours afflicted 
by ethnic and territorial conflicts” (Souleimanov et al. 2018, p.77; Van Herpen, 2015). The first 
of three key instruments that Russia uses, they identify, is “military deployments”, whereby 
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Russia maintains its military presence on the territory of the breakaway regions, usually under 
the guise of peacekeeping forces. This tactic safeguards the local population and keep them 
dependent on Russia for their security, as well as provides a deterrent against incursions from 
the Georgian side (p.79). The second instrument identified was “passportization”, which 
involves Russia granting the local citizens in the unrecognised state access to Russian 
citizenship. In doing so, it strengthens Russia’s justification for involvement as it is defending 
its own citizens from foreign governments (pp. 80-81). The third instrument leads on from the 
second – “responsibility to protect”. This involves Russia using citizens in the secessionist 
regions as a means to justify its use of the UN approved Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
mechanism (p.82). As a result, Russia was able to use this to legitimise its incursion into South 
Ossetia after the Georgian offensive as a means to protect its (newly “passportized”) citizens 
(pp.82-83). This study provides a unique insight into Russia’s strategy to maintain and increase 
its role as the dominant position in the South Caucasus, and how it uses the secessionist 
regions as leverage against Georgia. However, the study does not offer much explanation into 
the ways the use of unrecognised states as leverage directly impacts the foreign policy 
response of the country against which they are being used, in this case Georgia.   
Another important geopolitical factor in the region has been the newly formed Eurasian 
Economic Union. One article by M. Vardazaryan (2014) discusses the decision of Armenia 
policymakers to join the EAEU. Looking at various factors, Vardazaryan comes to the 
conclusion that Armenia’s decision to join the Russian-led customs union was due to the 
significantly more economically lucrative deal on offer by Russia, which in this case trumped 
the EU’s Association Agreement. According to Vardazaryan, in financial terms, the AA would 
offer Armenia 2.3% economic growth, worth $150 million. On the other hand, by joining the 
customs union Armenia would save $150 million in gas subsidies alone, and full membership 
would offer Armenia 4% economic growth, worth $400 million (p.34).   Moreover, the AA was 
conditional upon Armenia increasing its economic competitiveness and reforming its judicial 
and educational sectors. However, these were modest compared to Russian guarantees in 
terms of energy and military support (p.34). Thus, it appears for more profitable for Armenia 
to have joined the EAEU, than sign the AA with the EU. However, the study makes no 
reference to a potential backlash by Russia were Armenia to sign the AA, which would have 
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been probable, or to any intervening variables, such as those discussed by Åberg & Terzyan 
(2018).  
3.5 Conclusion 
There exists much literature on foreign policy in the South Caucasus. Each of the three 
countries provides in its own way an interesting topic of study, and while there have been a 
number of studies utilising neoclassical realist theory to examine Azerbaijani, Armenian, and 
Georgian foreign policy. However, in spite of this, there has yet to be a comprehensive study 
of the foreign policies of the three countries through the lenses of unit-level intervening 
variables. As such, an important dimension in the literature is missing. From previous 
research, it now appears clear that both unit- and system-level intervening variables influence 
foreign policy in the South Caucasus to some degree, while the power dynamics of larger 
countries in the region show it is still the international environment that dominates foreign 
policymaking in the South Caucasus. Moreover, other studies about the region offer insights 
into other influential factors, such as the development of new regional integration projects, 
and the status of unrecognised states. However, previous neoclassical realist literature tends 
to focus on the role of one or two IVVs without much regard for many other potential 
influences. In this way, the present hopes to offer a much broader analysis in each country 
and examine deeper the roles these variables play specifically because it analyses the foreign 
policies of the South Caucasus republics through the lenses of unit level variables.  
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4 Methodology and Research Design 
4.1 Methodology 
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are three small states with a common post-Soviet history. 
They all occupy a common geographical space in the South Caucasus, surrounded by Russia, 
Turkey, and Iran. They are all of a similar size, share similar political systems, and were all 
constituent republics of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I have used the most similar systems 
design as the base of my analysis. This study will examine the foreign policies of Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan over the course of the last 28 years, paying particular attention to 
the key moments of change, as well as structural changes over the years. These range from 
domestic situations like violent revolutions and regime overthrow, to reactions to 
international events, like foreign invasions and wars. The study is built on the structural realist 
basis with systemic stimuli as the main independent variable and foreign policy outcomes as 
the dependent variable and from there identifying intervening variables hope to clarify 
certain foreign policy outcomes, while maintaining the expectation that states will behave 
according to realist theory.   
The model drawn upon for this study is from a framework devised by Ripsman et al. (2016), 
who set out a clear path for the development for neoclassical realist studies of foreign policy. 
According to them, examining puzzling phenomena in international relations should in fact be 
called a “research puzzle” (as opposed to a single research question), which Ripsman et al. 
define as a “surprising outcome or causal sequence that appears anomalous from the 
predictions of existing theories” (p.102). This is an accurate representation of the current 
study, as it seeks to examine intervening variables that could possibly influence the foreign 
policy of three states of the same typology. A research puzzle, moreover, questions the 
existing consensus because it “highlights an observable outcome that does not appear to 
match theoretical expectations” (p.103). Ripsman et al. (2016) also note that neoclassical 
realist studies follow a “causes-of-effects” approach, in which the researcher seeks to identify 
patterns on the basis of well-selected case (pp.108-109), in this case on the basis of three 
small states of the same typology.  
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In this study, I seek to examine foreign policy outcomes in the South Caucasus and, using 
original source information, identify what the main drivers were that influenced those policy 
outcomes. Based on the collected information, it should be possible to identify the key 
systemic stimuli at the time, as well as any possible intervening variables.  Moreover, by taking 
into account perceived systemic constraints and opportunities, as well as the 
contemporaneous polarity of the international system, it should be possible to construct a 
clear picture of the systemic and domestic context in which these policy outcomes occurred. 
Bringing this all together under a neoclassical realist umbrella, this study should be able to 
offer an interesting and useful insight into the geostrategic position of the South Caucasus as 
well as, if at all, unit-level IVVs have influenced foreign policy.  
4.2 Research Design 
The research that I have undertaken as part of the thesis aims to test the underlying 
assumptions concerning the foreign policy of the states of the South Caucasus using a 
neoclassical realist theoretical framework. In order to gain a clear picture as to the main 
outcomes of, and factors contributing to, foreign policy making, I have conducted interviews 
with foreign policy experts in each of the three countries. In doing so, this study tries to build 
a clear picture of the main factors influencing each country’s foreign policy, both internally 
and externally. The last 28 years have seen great changes in the international system, with 
various powers rising and falling. As such, by only examining unit-level variables, the role of 
these systemic changes would not otherwise be mentioned.  
Because this study is examining foreign policy over a period of years, it is necessary to identify 
intervening variables of all levels (as outlined in the theoretical background chapter). It 
pursues a deductive strategy to identify intervening variables. Ripsman et al. (2016) mention 
that for studies on longer-term variables, it is advisable “to privilege variables from the 
strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions” categories since, 
according to them, “the impact of [elite preferences] diminishes over time” (p.114). However, 
this study does not exclude variables of this type since the nature of government in the South 
Caucasus is such that these countries tend to have very centralised power structures that give 
the leaders more power than they would in, say, a western democracy. As Elman (1995) notes, 
“The received wisdom in the field is that domestic determinants will be less salient when 
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studying small state behaviour because external constraints are more severe and the 
international system is more compelling” (p.172).  She goes on to mention, however, that 
“small state foreign policy provides a unique opportunity for those scholars who insist that 
that domestic politics matters in explaining international and foreign policy outcomes.” 
(p.172). In light of the numerous studies discussed above in the review of previous literature 
that examine the role of domestic-level variables on foreign policy in the South Caucasus, 
there is definite worth in studying potential influence of such variables on small state foreign 
policy. However, in contrast to most studies on foreign policy in the South Caucasus, which 
tend to focus specifically on one or two variables in one country, this study will identify and 
examine a number of intervening variables in all three countries over a longer period of time. 
In doing so, it should provide a broad insight into foreign policymaking in the South Caucasus.  
During the analysis, I will firstly identify occurrences of the IV, the international system and 
relative power capabilities of these countries, and where these were influential in foreign 
policymaking based on the research undertaken through interviews. From there, the IVVs will 
be identified and categorised according to the four types of IVV conceptualised in the 
theoretical section. After the identification of the variables, they will be analysed and 
discussed in order to find out under which conditions and circumstances the variables were 
influential. In doing so, it should build a clearer picture of the what influences foreign policy 
in the South Caucasus.   
Data Collection 
For this research, I have conducted 10 in-depth interviews of varying length totalling 414 
minutes (6.9 hours) of interviews. Four of these interviews were on Georgia, three on 
Armenia, and three on Azerbaijan, with foreign policy experts from Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan, who each discussed the foreign policy of their respective countries. I recorded 
each interview having first gained their permission to do so (using a voice recorder application 
for the in-person interviews and over skype for electronic interviews). The participants were 
contacted via email and asked if they wanted to participate. Those that chose to participate 
were given a consent form and a plain language statement to make sure they understand fully 
the purpose of the research and the interview they were about to undertake. The participants 
were chosen based on their expertise of foreign policy in their country and each one was 
asked only about their own country. It was important to conduct expert interviews because 
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the previous literature, while providing in-depth examinations and explanations, was also 
lacking details, such as the influence of other important factors, such as societal factors, and 
not only details of the foreign policymaking elite. Moreover, these interviews were able to 
provide up to date information of recent events, such as the recent Armenian revolution, 
about which not much literature exists.   
 Some interviews were conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia by myself, and the rest I conducted over 
electronic communication, primarily over Skype, as well as one via written answers to the 
interview questions. In addition, one interview partner chose to remain anonymous, and the 
information gained from that particular interview will not be discussed. The interviews were 
semi-structured in that I would ask a question and allow the participants flexibility in their 
response. I would ask further questions to delve deeper into the subject, not always following 
the set interview questions. During the interviews themselves, I first asked the participants to 
divide (if possible) the history of their country since 1991 into specific periods of foreign 
policy. I then asked them a number of questions, which would identify domestic and external 
intervening variables that influence. From there, I categorised the variables according to the 
different types of intervening variables discussed above in the theoretical chapter.  
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5 Empirical Discussion 
It should first be noted that the periods of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia, and Ayaz Mutalibov 
and Abulfez Elchibey in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s are not discussed in this section because, 
due to the incoherence of their foreign policy and the chaotic nature of foreign policy at the 
time, as well as the lack of foreign policy outcomes of their respective foreign policies, those 
interviewed as part of the research broadly agree that examining foreign policy during this 
period is largely irrelevant. In terms of structure, I will first discuss the role of the independent 
variable in foreign policymaking. After this, I shall breakdown the research by type of IVV. 
Within each IVV, I shall further breakdown by country, and then chronologically, working 
forward from the earliest occurrence to the latest. This IVV section focuses on identifying the 
instances of IVV influence. After this section will follow an empirical analysis, in which the role 
of the independent and intervening variables and the impact they had on foreign policy will 
be analysed in detail, as well as the ways in which this research compares to other previous 
studies.   
5.1 International System and Relative Power Capabilities 
When compared to the intervening variables, cases of the international system and state 
material power influencing foreign policy in the South Caucasus were much more prevalent. 
Indeed, to list and explain every instance identified in the research would require an entire 
book to accomplish. However, in order to demonstrate the supreme influence of the 
independent variable of this study, I shall use some particular examples identified in the 
research.   
The first example concerns that of the lack of state power in Georgia during the 1990s. 
According to Ghia Nodia, until 1995, Shevardnadze’s foreign policy was largely aimed at 
gaining humanitarian support because Georgia was essentially a failed state.1 As such, 
Georgian foreign policy was tailored primarily towards state-building and establishing positive 
relations with other nations that could help in that regard. Davit Darchiashvili mentions in this 
regard that the lack of state capacity in Georgia was one of the main factors affecting foreign 
                                               
1 (Ghia Nodia, Personal Communication, 10/07/2019) 
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policy. In response to the question of how state capacity affected foreign policy, Darchiashvili 
noted during an interview:  
“I think directly. I think it was one of the main reasons, if not the only reason, because when 
the state is not able to function and provide services and maintain the monopoly of violence, 
to provide national cohesion, then such a state can hardly have a consistent foreign policy.”2 
The restoration of territorial integrity also played an important role in foreign policymaking 
in Georgia. During Shevardnadze’s leadership, he considered that Russia could guarantee the 
restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia, because of which he pursued a more pro-
Russian foreign policy between 1993 and 1999. During this time, Georgia joined the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and the Common Security Treaty Organisation. 
However, when it became clear that Russia would not fulfil this aspiration and, indeed, when 
Russian peacekeepers were involved in the renewed conflict in Abkhazia in 1998, Georgia 
began to drift towards the West and left the Russian political and military structures of the 
CIS and CSTO in 1999.3 Furthermore, Tornike Sharashenidze noted that early during 
Saakashvili’s presidency, the role of restoring territorial integrity was key in driving Georgia 
towards an aggressively pro-American foreign policy.4 These factors (namely improving 
Georgia’s state capacity and restoring territorial integrity) demonstrate the role of Georgia’s 
material power capabilities (or lack thereof) in pushing its foreign policy towards other 
countries that the Georgian leadership thought could help improve the country’s situation. 
Firstly, it sought Russian assistance by joining Russian-led international bodies. When this 
strategy failed to solve Georgia’s problems, it began to turn towards a more western-oriented 
foreign policy.   
Another key factor that strongly influenced foreign policy in both Georgia and Azerbaijan was 
the increasing western interest in Caspian Sea oil exploration. During the 1990s, major energy 
companies from a number of countries, including the US and Russia, joined the Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC) consortium beginning the mass international 
exploitation of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas supplies in the Caspian Sea (de Waal, 2010, p. 175). In 
                                               
2 (Davit Darchiashvili, Personal Communication, 25/06/2019) 
3 (Nika Chitadze, Personal Communication, 25/06/2019) 
4 (Tornike Sharashenidze, Personal Communication, 20/06/2019) 
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Georgia, this started a turn in orientation from Russia towards the West. The process was 
gradual until 1999, however, due to Georgia’s continued hopes that Russia would be the 
guarantor of its territorial integrity.5 One of the major breakthroughs, according to an 
interview with Tornike Sharashenidze, was the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline carrying Azerbaijani oil through Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea, which 
marked “the first time that Caspian oil was transported to oil markets bypassing Russia.”6 This 
was followed by the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, which made Georgia less dependent 
on Russian energy supplies. Indeed, thanks to this project, Georgia currently receives 90% of 
its natural gas from Azerbaijan.7 This decreasing dependence on Russian energy, combined 
with a weakened Russia after the 1998 financial crash in Russia, allowed Georgia considerably 
more international flexibility to pursue a more balanced foreign policy in the late 1990s, to 
the point that Georgia declared its intention to join NATO at the 2002 NATO Prague summit.8 
The 2008 Russia-Georgia War was also very influential on Georgian foreign policy. Before the 
war, Georgia had been pursuing a very pro-western and particularly pro-American foreign 
policy in order to restore Georgian territorial integrity.9 However, the lack of action in support 
of Georgia on the part of the West during the war resulted in Georgia becoming less pro-
American and instead becoming more pro-European and regionally balanced after the 
conflict.10 For example, Ghia Nodia noted in an interview that before the war, Georgia had 
fairly bad relations with Iran and Belarus, whereas afterwards it built very positive relations 
with the two counties, “becoming more independent of the US and more balanced.”11 As 
such, we can see that when the US in particular failed to live up to Georgian expectations of 
support during the crisis, it was subsequently forced to look elsewhere, in this case towards 
improving relations with other countries, while at the same time not abandoning its pro-
European aspirations. On this same point, however, Kevork Oskanian (2016) argues that 
Georgia’s foreign policy shift after the war was due to the Georgian elites’ previous perception 
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that the West would provide tangible support to help it regain its breakaway regions of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, I would disagree with this and instead suggest that the fault 
was not the elites’ perception of the dedication of the West’s commitment to Georgia, but in 
fact the systemic clarity with which the Georgian FPE saw their options during the situation. 
In other words, Georgian policymakers believed it was clear the US and Europe would support 
Georgia to the extent that they would enable it to retake its lost territories. The cause of the 
decision to go to war was thus not a unit-level but system-level variable. Nevertheless, 
Georgia maintained and deepened its relations with NATO and the EU after 2008, establishing 
the NATO-Georgia Commission the same year, joining the EU’s Eastern Partnership in 2009, 
and signing the EUAA in 2014.12 
Armenia is a country where the international system has played perhaps the most prominent 
role in influencing foreign policy. Ever since Armenia became independent of the USSR, it has 
been in conflict with Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. According to 
Benyamin Poghosyan, at the beginning of its independence, Armenia pursued two main goals; 
to establish good relations with all powers in the South Caucasus, including Turkey, Iran, 
Russia, the US, and Europe, and secondly to resolve the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.13 After the conflict escalated into war and Turkey declared its support for Azerbaijan, 
Armenia was forced into finding strategic external partners willing to defend its security, the 
only candidate for which was Russia. As such, Poghosyan notes, Armenia “will develop [its] 
relations with all other partners to the extent that it does not jeopardise or threaten the 
Russian-Armenian strategic alliance.” 14 The systemic constraint of the strategic partnership 
thus significantly limits Armenia’s room for manoeuvre in terms of foreign policy and has done 
since the early 1990s.  
Another example of the systemic constraints imposed upon Armenia are its closed borders 
with Azerbaijan and Turkey and, in particular, the way it drove Levon Ter-Petrosyan to pursue 
better relations by giving concessions over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. According to 
Poghosyan, while Armenia had pursued good relations with other countries in the region, 
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13 (Benyamin Poghosyan, Personal Communication, 08/07/2019) 
14 (Benyamin Poghosyan, Personal Communication, 08/07/2019) 
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such as joining the NATO Partnership for Peace and establishing the strategic partnership with 
Russia, Ter-Petrosyan understood that Armenia would not be able to develop economically if 
the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan were to remain closed.15 Thus, while Armenian 
society’s forcing Ter-Petrosyan to step down after trying to make concessions was a “strategic 
culture” IVV [see above], the constraints imposed by the closed borders were undoubtedly 
systemic and therefore strongly limited Ter-Petrosyan’s choices.  
Regional stability is also an important systemic issue that has influenced Armenian foreign 
policy. According to Anna Karapetyan, a good example is the effect of US-Iranian relations; 
because Iran is a very important trading partner for Armenia, notably in terms of its being a 
major supplier of oil to Armenia, the poor relations between the US and Iran, which have 
resulted in international sanctions being placed on Iran, have and will continue to affect 
Armenia negatively while at the same time Armenia is powerless to stop it.16 Thus Armenia 
finds itself being indirectly negatively affected by other states’ disputes in the international 
system. 
As mentioned above, no intervening variables could be identified to have influenced 
Azerbaijani foreign policy since its independence. The information collected from the 
interviews made clear that the foreign policy of Azerbaijan is primarily influenced by system-
level factors. The first system-level factors influencing Azerbaijani foreign policy identified 
from the research was the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since gaining independence, 
Azerbaijan has been in conflict with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-
Karabakh, which has had a significant impact on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. According to 
Rovshan Ibrahimov, the conflict, which ended in a ceasefire in 1994 but which yet remains 
unresolved, has been frozen without solution by Russia in order for Russia to maintain a 
significant “instrument of pressure over both Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to prevent the 
possible presence of the West into the region and the possible move of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia towards the West, NATO and the EU.”17 As such, Azerbaijan, since 1993, has pursued 
a strategy “to attract as many big powers as possible into the region and to keep all these 
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powers at the same distance” in order to balance Russian power in the region, which was at 
the time the only major power with interest in the South Caucasus and against which 
Azerbaijan was powerless.18 The rationale behind this was that “the more actors there are in 
the region, the more interests will be diversified and flexibility and manoeuvring will be 
increased.”19 In order to fulfil this strategy of brining more powers to the region, Azerbaijan 
used its oil and gas resources to attract western energy companies epitomised in the ‘Contract 
of the Century”, signed in 1994. Furthermore, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline 
marked the first time that was able to export its natural resources bypassing Russia, which 
marked a great decrease in dependence on Russia and greater cooperation with other global 
and regional partners. Thus, Azerbaijan’s physical energy resources, their exploitation by 
foreign energy companies and transnational regional energy pipeline construction (excluding 
Russia) have been the key driver of Azerbaijani foreign policy since its independence, 
especially so since Heydar Aliyev came to power in 1993, and allow Azerbaijan to pursue a 
successful balancing strategy by which it is not pushed or pulled away or towards any regional 
power.       
However, while this strategy has broadly remained unchanged, there has been one key 
moment since 1993 that has challenged this policy, namely the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. 
After the war, Azerbaijan pursued a more neutral path:  
“The weakening of the West’s and the corresponding strengthening of Russia’s influence in 
the South Caucasus, exemplified by the [Russian] invasion of Georgia in 2008, provided 
Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet states with an incentive towards pro-Russian behaviour. 
That, in turn, resulted in the modification of their foreign policies towards recognizing Russia 
as a reaffirmed regional hegemon.”20   
In response to increasing Russian regional power in the South Caucasus and Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan decided to join the Non-Aligned Movement in May 2011 and has maintained its 
strategy not to securitise its interests with other powers nor “move towards excessive 
rapprochement with any of them.”21 As noted by Anar Valiyev, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has 
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been reactive rather than proactive, responding to changes in the international system as 
opposed to actively seeking to change the system.22 From the theoretical framework, the 
systemic issue of polarity is relevant here. The increase of Russian power in the South 
Caucasus after the 2008 war saw a change in the polarity of the international system, which 
saw Russia becoming a much larger pole of power in the region. As such, the subsequent 
alteration of Azerbaijani foreign policy, which saw it becoming more neutral and cautious, 
was a response to the changing polarity of the international system from unipolar to 
multipolar. Moreover, this decision was also an instance where the clarity of the system, 
namely that Russia was gaining an increasingly important position in the region, was used by 
the Azerbaijani FPE to make a strategic alteration of their foreign policy in response to the 
systemic changes.  
On the whole, in response to the question of whether or not domestic factors have any 
influence on Azerbaijani foreign policy, Rovshan Ibrahimov stated categorically:  
“No, absolutely not. As it is in domestic policy and foreign policy as well… It’s very stable, very 
foreseeing, very clear, very pragmatic, and can only be changed if external factors were 
sharply changed.”23   
Overall, foreign policy in the South Caucasus has been strongly influenced by the international 
system and these states’ material power capabilities. In Georgia during the 1990s, the lack of 
state power and the widespread corruption that plagued state functioning, as well as the lack 
of territorial integrity due to the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia led Georgia to exhibit 
bandwagoning behaviour towards Russia in the form of joining the CIS and CSTO. With lesser 
energy dependence on Russia and the increase in state capacity, Georgia gained confidence 
internationally and sought to build greater ties with the West. However, this confidence faced 
a backlash after the 2008 war and Georgia has since pursued a more cautious strategy while 
not abandoning its pro-western orientation.  
Since independence Armenia has struggled with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, for which it is 
heavily dependent on Russia for security. While it pursues good relations with all powers in 
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the region (to the extent it does not infringe upon the Russia-Armenia strategic partnership), 
the international constraints caused by the conflict have severely limited Armenia’s room for 
manoeuvre. Moreover, any attempts to make concessions on the Karabakh issue are met with 
hostility by Armenian society, thus further limiting Armenia’s foreign policy choices. 
Azerbaijan too is also bound by systemic constraints, although not nearly to the same degree 
as Georgia or Armenia. That being said, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy strategy is reactive as 
opposed to proactive and, as such, does not seek to pursue any policy options that could 
jeopardise its comparatively fortunate position compared to its smaller neighbours thanks to 
its natural resource wealth.   
One key factor that has strongly influenced all three countries is Russia. Ever since the three 
countries became independent, Russia has sought to maintain its hold on the region in many 
ways, shapes, or forms.  Russian control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been a major 
impediment for Georgia internationally because with the ongoing dispute, Georgia will almost 
definitely fail to achieve its goals of NATO and EU membership. For Armenia, the importance 
of the strategic partnership strongly limits Armenia’s foreign policy choices vis-à-vis other 
states. Moreover, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are limited internationally by the frozen 
Karabakh conflict, which Russia has used as an instrument of pressure over both countries. 
Russia has also exerted pressure over Azerbaijan in other, indirect ways: 
“If any instrument of pressure is needed for Russia, they always pressed on Georgia. It’s 
enough to press on Georgia in order to make problems for Azerbaijan because all strategic 
routes for energy and the economy are interrelated with Georgia. So, it’s less costly to press 
on Georgia rather than on Azerbaijan, but the result will be the same.”24   
5.2 Intervening Variables  
5.2.1 Elite Preferences 
The first occurrence of an elite preferences IVV identified by the interviews influencing foreign 
policy found in Georgia occurred during the period of Mikheil Saakashvili’s leadership of the 
country. From 2003 until 2012, Georgia had a markedly pro-western orientation, which 
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occurred largely as a result of the revolutionary government under Saakashvili’s leadership. 
He and his FPE were very pro-western in their ideology, which was reflected in their foreign 
policy. Indeed, in 2005 Georgia adopted its first national security concept25 outlining its goals 
of western integration openly.26 Moreover, as noted by Ghia Nodia during an interview, 
Saakashvili’s FPE were very cohesive and centralised in their preferences and they did not 
face any strong institutional opposition from the Georgian Parliament nor any other domestic 
actors. 27 A particular instance in which elite preferences influenced foreign policy is the way 
in which Saakashvili’s foreign policy affected Georgia’s relations with Russia. In reference to 
Saakashvili’s power after the death of his co-revolutionary Zurab Zhvania in 2005, Tornike 
Sharashenidze stated that “Saakashvili was too impulsive… he was left alone and unchecked, 
so to say… that’s how our [Georgian] foreign policy became more impulsive… extremely anti-
Russian.”28 Because of Saakashvili’s strong pro-NATO and pro-EU foreign policy, relations with 
Russia deteriorated. According to Davit Darchiashvili, Saakashvili’s desire to join NATO “was 
probably the main reason why relations with Russia deteriorated… eventually leading to 
war.”29 As such, the FPE in Saakashvili’s government’s ideological preference for a pro-
Western foreign policy strongly affected Georgia’s relations with Russia, the outcome of 
which was continuously worsening relations to the point that the two countries eventually 
went to war. Of course, the unresolved system-level issue of Russian-occupied Georgian 
territories in Abkhazia and South Ossetia set the conditions for a future conflict between 
Georgia and Russia, but in this case Saakashvili’s pro-western orientation contributed to the 
deterioration in relations to the point where a conflict could happen.    
Another example occurs during the leadership of the Georgian Dream Coalition (GD) led by 
Bidzina Ivanishvili (2012-present). In contrast to Saakashvili’s very proactive western 
orientation, Ivanishvili’s government has been very passive diplomatically.30 Rather than 
pursuing Saakashvili’s approach with the same vigour, the GD has remained pro-western, 
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particularly pro-EU, while taking a cautious approach towards Russia.31 However, in contrast 
to his predecessor, Ivanishvili is a billionaire businessman with vested interest in his 
businesses. As such, in response to the question of why Ivanishvili maintains seeks to maintain 
good relations with both the West and Russia, Sharashenidze noted:  
“He has to care, first of all, about his family and his businesses. For that he needs good 
relations with both the West and Russia. After that, he wants Georgia to be safe and secure 
because he wants to live here, and for that he needs good relations with both Russia… and 
the West.” 32 
Thus, it is suggested that Ivanishvili’s vested business interests to a degree influenced his 
government’s foreign policy decision-making, namely by improving relations with Russia by 
restoring trade between the two countries. However, Ivanishvili’s decision-making is 
notoriously obscure and it is uncertain who makes particular decisions. According to Ghia 
Nodia, “there is no clear centre or clear process where and how any decisions are made” and 
we can only guess which decisions he takes himself and which he delegates to other.”33 
Because of this lack of transparency, it is unfortunately not possible to determine accurately 
the decision-making process of the GD government. Nevertheless, expert opinion does 
suggest certain individuals, primarily those close to Ivanishvili, have significant influence. Ghia 
Nodia mentions the role of a “special representative of the PM who was appointed just to 
deal with Russia” whose mandate was only about “humanitarian and economic issues.”34 
Although it is unknown exactly what was said in meetings with his Russian counterpart, the 
result was a significant improvement in the economic relations between the two countries.35 
Another example of obscure and unquantifiable influence is from a cousin of Bidzina 
Ivanishvili – Ucha Mamasashvili.  According to Darchiashvili, Mamasashvili “is no one – he has 
no formal positions, he is simply employed in [Ivanishvili’s] business empire… [he] has more 
influence and more weight than formal ministers.”36 While it is not possible to identify 
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precisely this individual’s influence, least of all in foreign policy, it is clear that such people are 
a part of Ivanishvili’s FPE and thus have some influence over government policy.  
In Armenia, elite preferences IVVs were also the most frequently occurring. The first case 
presented from the interviews concerns the leadership of Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008). 
Kocharyan’s leadership was (especially after May 2000, when Kocharyan’s regime became 
more authoritarian and consolidated) very cohesive, being “like a pyramid” in structure, with 
himself at the top.37 According to Benyamin Poghosyan, under Kocharyan Armenia 
significantly increased its economic dependence on Russia when key parts of the economy, 
such as “telecommunications, Armenian Railways, some power generation plants, and the 
Armenian gas and electricity distribution network” were sold off or given as concessions to 
Russian companies in order to fulfil Kocharyan’s goal to “establish an economic alliance with 
Russia, and thus “solidifying [Russia’s] economic influence over Armenia.”38 In this sense, the 
strategy of Robert Kocharyan and his FPE’s preference for increasingly closer relations with 
Russia influenced Armenian foreign policy towards Russia as it brought the two countries 
much closer by allowing much greater economic control by Russian companies. However, this 
should not be seen as a major change in direction in foreign policy; Russia and Armenia (under 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan) had already established a very deep strategic partnership during the 
mid-1990s and, as such, this could be seen as part of the deepening relationship between the 
two counties.   
Another case from the Kocharyan period concerns his approach towards international 
recognition of the Armenian Genocide. While there were no significant changes in Armenian 
foreign policy under Kocharyan, his personal emphasis on international genocide recognition 
can be seen as a minor technical change in Armenian foreign policy.39    
During the leadership of Serzh Sargsyan (2008-2018), a number of elite preferences IVVs have 
also been identified. Firstly, it should be noted that Sargsyan’s leadership was similar in 
structure to Kocharyan’s and very cohesive, not coming under much public pressure until 
2016.40 When Sargsyan came to power, he began negotiating with Turkey to establish 
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diplomatic relations and open the Turkish-Armenian border to allow trade and support the 
development of the Armenian economy. This process, known colloquially as “football 
diplomacy” due to the leaders of the two countries attending football matches together, 
ended in the Zurich Protocols, which were signed in 2009.41 While Turkey ultimately rejected 
the protocols due to the lack of progress on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, this is a good 
example of how the Armenian leader’s preferences to improve relations with Turkey, in 
contrast to his predecessor, could have led to improved foreign policy between the two 
nations. Similarly, the period between 2009 and 2011 was, according to Poghosyan, “a very 
active phase of negotiations” between Armenia and Azerbaijan to find a solution to the issue 
of Nagorno-Karabakh.42 While a basic agreement was reached and was to be signed in Kazan 
during the summer of 2011, ultimately Ilham Aliyev rejected to sign the agreement, resulting 
in a deadlock.43 Nonetheless, this is an example of the change of approach influenced by the 
Armenian FPE’s preferences towards the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
A final occurrence of an elite preferences IVV identified in Armenia is that of the Armenian 
leaders’ relationship to Nagorno-Karabakh and their approach to solving the conflict. 
Specifically, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan were both from Nagorno-Karabakh, and as 
such they negotiated internationally on behalf of both Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. When 
Kocharyan came to power, he changed the negotiation format from trilateral (Armenia-
Azerbaijan-Nagorno-Karabakh) to bilateral (Armenia-Azerbaijan).44 This has subsequently 
changed with the new leadership of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who is not a native of 
the breakaway territory. On coming to power, Pashinyan has stated that he does not have 
the authority to negotiate on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh since he is not a native of the 
territory and did not participate himself in the conflict and would thus like to see the return 
of the trilateral format with Nagorno-Karabakh at the negotiating table.45 While negotiations 
are continuing with Azerbaijan, there is little chance of them being productive since 
Azerbaijan does not recognise the independence of the territory and thus does not recognise 
their legitimacy at the negotiating table. In this regard, the very background of the Armenian 
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leader can have an impact on foreign policy in terms of Armenia’s negotiation strategy vis-à-
vis Nagorno-Karabakh. However, while this has yet to translate into any meaningful foreign 
policy outcomes since the process of negotiation is continuous and has seen both ups and 
downs to no avail, it nonetheless demonstrates the effect of Nikol Pashinyan’s preference not 
to negotiate on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh due to his particular background not coming 
from there and not having the legitimacy to do so.      
5.2.2 Strategic Culture 
The only significant IVV that can be classified as strategic culture occurred in Armenia, 
concerning Armenian society’s attitudes towards, and perceptions of, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. According to Benyamin Poghosyan, after the ceasefire in 1994, Armenian society has 
considered the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be already solved. Thus, when leaders attempt 
to change the situation, it is often met with hostility.46 In the case of the leadership of Levon 
Ter-Petrosyan, his desire to change the situation by making concessions to Azerbaijan in the 
form of returning territories significantly contributed to his eventual downfall. Poghosyan 
notes:  
“The resentment against Ter-Petrosyan was not due to his foreign policy. Not due to the 
decision to sign an agreement on the Russian military base or the mutual defence and 
cooperation with Russia. It was mainly triggered by the sharp decline of the socio-economic 
situation in Armenia. Why was he attacked? When he said we have to make concessions on 
the Karabakh issue… we have to give lands back to Azerbaijan.”47 
While Ter-Petrosyan’s popularity in Armenia had been declining significantly since the 1996 
election, which was perceived to be rigged and after which he could only keep power 
through the support of the army, as well as the sharp decline in the living standards of the 
people, his decision to make concessions significantly contributed to his downfall.48 This can 
thus be categorised as a strategic culture IVV since, while not leading to any major 
international outcomes, the societal beliefs within Armenia, namely that the leadership 
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should not make concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh, hindered Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s ability 
to act on the issue to the extent that he had to step down.   
5.2.3 State-Society Relations 
Perhaps the most significant factor that can be categorised under state-society relations in 
the South Caucasus is the issue of corruption. In response to the question of what internal 
factors that affected Georgian foreign policy under Eduard Shevardnadze, Nika Chitadze 
noted that high-level corruption played a significant role:  
“The institutions were corrupted and it was very difficult to control them… Because, as they 
say, foreign policy is a reflection of internal policy. And, of course, gradually it was becoming 
more and more difficult for Shevardnadze to establish close contact with western countries 
because many western authoritative institutions like Freedom House or Corruption Index etc… 
they considered Georgia a country with big problems related to corruption.”49 
Chitadze gave the example of countries not wanting to help Georgia financially since it could 
give no guarantee that the money would be properly distributed. Moreover, foreign investors 
were strongly put off from investing in Georgia as their investments would not be protected.50 
As such, this is an example of the way in which the culture of corruption strongly impeded 
Shevardnadze’s quest to improve the country through foreign western investment and thus 
how much the government could extract from its society in terms of foreign policymaking.    
Another Georgian example of state-society relations comes recently, during the leadership of 
Salome Zurabishvili of the GD. According to an interview with Ghia Nodia, after the incident 
of the invitation of a Russian MP to attend the Georgian parliament on the 20th June 2019, 
during which he was sitting in the chair of the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, large anti-
occupation and anti-Putin protests opposing the government for being anti-democratic and 
pro-Russian began in Tbilisi.51 As a result, “the government was really pushed to strengthen 
its rhetoric against Russia.” Moreover, after a particularly obscene rant by someone on 
Georgian television, this sparked a backlash in the Russian Duma (Parliament), during which 
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there were some calls to introduce some economic sanctions against Georgia.52 While 
ultimately this situation led only to Russia imposing a short ban on flights between Georgia 
and Russia, it is an example of how public protests were able to influence (albeit to only a 
minor degree) the Georgian government’s position on its relations with Russia.   
Finally, another example of state-society relations affecting foreign policy in the South 
Caucasus occurred in Armenia under Serzh Sargsyan. Among Armenian society, according to 
Poghosyan, there had been an attitude of forgiving (or at least overlooking) the practices of 
“entrenched corruption, nepotism, lack of rule of law [and] lack of good governance” among 
the Armenian elite because they had previously safeguarded Armenian security effectively.53 
However, after the brief four-day war with Azerbaijan in 2016, which resulted in small 
territorial losses for Armenia, the Armenian public began to question seriously the ability of 
the government to provide territorial security for the population. Poghosyan notes that this, 
combined with Sargsyan’s decision not to sign the EUAA, was “a key blow” to Sargsyan’s 
leadership.54 However, while this weakened Sargsyan’s leadership, even to the point of his 
eventual resignation, it was not responsible for any significant foreign policy outcomes.     
5.3 Empirical Analysis 
Table 1: Occurrence of Intervening Variables based on Research Interviews 
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INTERVENING VARIABLES GEORGIA ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN 
Elite Preferences 2 4 0 
Strategic Culture 0 1 0 
State-Society Relations 2 1 0 
Domestic Institutions 0 0 0 
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The data collected from the interviews conducted produced a number of interesting findings. 
The first major result that can be mentioned here is that of the three countries under 
examination, instances of unit-level IVVs having an effect on foreign policy occurred most 
often in Armenia and the least influence in Azerbaijan. Indeed, perhaps one of the most 
interesting outcomes of this research is that of all the information collected on Azerbaijan, no 
intervening variables could be identified. The significance of this will be discussed later.  
The research found that, based on the interviews, domestic institutions in fact play a minor 
role in foreign policymaking in the South Caucasus since not one instance of domestic 
institutions influencing foreign policymaking was found. This, I suggest, is the result of the 
overwhelming role of the international system and the material power capabilities of the 
South Caucasus, as well as the nature of the regimes governing these countries (i.e. that the 
leadership is often very strong and cohesive, leaving little room for other domestic actors to 
have any influence). Hence the greater preponderance of IVVs categorised under “elite 
preferences”, whereby the room for the FPE’s preferences to have some influence is 
understandably larger.  
Of particular note is the comparatively frequent occurrence of IVVs in Armenia, particularly 
of “elite preferences” variables. These occurrences were due primarily to the leaders 
attempting to improve relations between Armenia and other countries, such as Kocharyan’s 
increasing Russian control over the Armenian economy and international genocide 
recognition, as well as Sargsyan’s trying to improve relations with Turkey through “football 
diplomacy” and being able to increase cooperation with the EU, albeit to the extent that he 
was not allowed to jeopardise the strategic partnership with Russia. The reason for the 
preponderance of elite preferences IVVs was, based on the interviews, due the largely 
cohesive nature of the regimes in Armenia and the lack of opposition they faced from society 
or other domestic actors.   
Those elite preferences IVVs found in the case of Georgia, while less numerous, are much 
more substantial. As per the research interviews, the first case – Saakashvili’s extremely pro-
western foreign policy – involved seismic changes not only to Georgia’s foreign policy, but to 
the country as a whole. At that time, Georgia experienced not only a radical change of 
government, but over the years after the Rose Revolution in 2003 it saw a massive increase 
in state capacity. As also noted by Gvalia et al. (2019), this increase in state capacity gave 
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Georgia the relative power capabilities needed to pursue an effective foreign policy agenda, 
which was thus a system-level variable. However, it was the elite preferences, namely 
Saakashvili’s FPE’s pro-western ideological preferences, that guided Georgia effectively 
towards the west. Another area where there is likely influence at the level of elite preferences 
is in the leadership of Bidzina Ivanishvili. While it seems quite probable, based on the 
research, that certain individuals close to Ivanishvili (such as those discussed above) have a 
lot of influence on the decision-making process, unfortunately the secretive nature of 
decision-making makes it difficult to quantify such influence, and thus we cannot know for 
sure.  
More often than not, the occurrence of IVV influence has been on the part of elite decision-
makers, in particular the president or prime minister. In Georgia, for example, the FPE’s own 
personal preferences regarding Russia can have a large impact on the relations between the 
two countries – negatively in the case of Saakashvili and more positively in the case of 
Shevardnadze and Ivanishvili. In Armenia, while the FPE’s preferences have not determined 
or changed Armenia’s foreign policy strategy significantly, they have been responsible for 
some minor changes; the approach towards the Karabakh conflict’s negotiations has changed 
format depending on whether or not the leaders themselves were from Karabakh, as is the 
case with Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, and not in the case of Nikol Pashinyan.  
Previous studies of foreign policy using a neoclassical realist theoretical basis have also found 
variables that can be categorised as elite preferences IVVs. Gvalia et al. (2013; 2019) found 
that elite ideas and elite cohesion were influential in foreign policymaking in Georgia, 
particularly after the Rose Revolution and during Saakashvili’s leadership. This was also a 
finding in the present study, which found the FPE’s foreign policy strategy to be cohesive and 
influential in driving Georgia’s pro-western agenda. However, Gvalia et al. (2019) also 
demonstrated the importance of the system-level factor of state capacity in foreign 
policymaking, which significantly hindered the government of Eduard Shevardnadze and 
which improved markedly under Saakashvili. This is somewhat similar to the current study, 
although here it was found in particular that corruption played an important role in limiting 
Georgia’s foreign policy abilities during the 1990s. In this case it was classified as a “state-
society relations” IVV. 
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One key area where the present study differs from other academic research is in its 
explanation of the actions taken by the Georgian government during the 2008 war with 
Russia. Kevork Oskanian (2016) argued that it was caused by the Georgian FPE’s perceptions 
of western support for their cause of territorial integrity, which would thus in this study come 
under “elite preferences” as an IVV due to their desire to regain control over their breakaway 
territories combined with their belief that it was possible with western support. However, it 
seems logical, based on information collected in the current study, that this perception was 
actually due to a lack of clarity in the international system and was thus in fact a system-level 
factor.       
The one instance of a “strategic culture” variable affecting foreign policy occurred in Armenia. 
In this instance, the information gained from the expert interviews suggested that Armenian 
society itself was able to influence foreign policy in a way that limited the foreign policy 
choices open to the Armenian FPE, namely by forcing Levon Ter-Petrosyan to resign for trying 
to make concessions over Nagorno-Karabakh. A common attitude widely shared in Armenian 
society is that the conflict is already solved and Armenia should simply move on. In this regard, 
it is thus unlikely that Armenian society would permit its leaders to give away any concessions 
on the issue, which they would see as a betrayal. This is what happened to Ter-Petrosyan and, 
as such, his successors learnt from his mistake of misjudging public opinion. This particular 
case, however, does not demonstrate direct influence of a particular IVV on foreign policy. 
Rather, it shows the limits placed on foreign policymakers by Armenian society.    
The instances of state-society relations type IVVs were also found to have influence. The case 
found in Georgia of the recent protests during the summer of 2019, which saw the Georgian 
government change its rhetoric towards Russia, resulted in a minor diplomatic incident and a 
slight worsening in relations. While this case can be considered of minor importance in the 
grand scale of things, it was insightful of how state-society relations can exert some influence 
in an environment dominated by external factors. While previous research has highlighted 
the issues of elite ideas and cohesion, as well as state capacity, which are also found in this 
research, here it was also found that society can also put pressure on the government to act 
in a certain way, although this, again, concerns more how a government should not act rather 
than how it should specifically. Moreover, the brief conflict with Azerbaijan in 2016 also 
demonstrated the influence of society on Armenian foreign policy, namely their expectations 
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of their government in terms of providing security. Similar to the cases of state-society 
relations in Georgia, in Armenia too the influence of these factors lies more in the way they 
limit the policy options open to the FPE, rather than determining specific foreign policy 
outcomes.  
Azerbaijan, significantly, did not exhibit any influence from IVVs in its foreign policy based on 
the interviews. As seen in the discussion of system-level factors based on the collected 
evidence, Azerbaijani foreign policy is very much reactive to international stimuli, as opposed 
to seeking change caused by domestic factors. This is perhaps the result of a very consolidated 
FPE that exerts great power over Azerbaijani society. The authoritarian regime further inhibits 
any influence from domestic actors or society, which makes Azerbaijan a good example of the 
way in which structural realist theory would predict a state in Azerbaijan’s position should 
behave. Its pragmatic response to systemic stimuli, such as its more cautious approach to 
Russia in light of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, combined with its large-scale oil and natural 
gas exploitation make it in Azerbaijan’s interest to preserve regional stability and to avoid 
significant influence from any other country. This strategy was referred to by Valiyev & 
Mamishova (2019) as “strategic hedging”, in which Azerbaijan metaphorically acts like a 
magnet, attracting and repelling other actors to keep them in balance at a distance.   
The key systemic factors of clarity and polarity were also influential, according to the research. 
This was perhaps most clearly seen in the case of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, which had a 
number of implications for foreign policymaking in the South Caucasus. As demonstrated 
above, the clarity of systemic constraints facing Georgia was particularly influential in the 
decision to go to war in 2008. While there is a very fine line between the clarity of systemic 
information and the perception of that information by the FPE (with which they form their 
foreign policy), the information itself derives from systemic stimuli and is thus a primary 
causal factor in foreign policymaking. Moreover, the change in the polarity of the 
international system after the 2008 war was very influential in making the Azerbaijani FPE 
pursue a more cautious and neutral policy towards Russia to avoid becoming involved in any 
conflict or tension with Russia. As such, the polarity of the system, as well as its clarity to the 
FPE, are key drivers of foreign policymaking.  
While the experts’ opinions suggest there is at least some room for unit-level IVVs to exert 
influence to varying degrees under certain conditions, overall it is clear that the international 
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system and the material power capabilities of the states of the South Caucasus have been the 
main drivers of foreign policymaking in these countries. The constraints posed on these 
countries by the international system are hugely influential, namely due to the lack of power 
of these countries and their much larger neighbours’, especially Russia’s, influence and power 
in the region. The systemic constraints imposed by Russia is an overarching theme throughout 
the study and one which shows that small states are forced to consider their powerful 
neighbours when making foreign policy decisions. While in the 1990s, when all three 
countries were very weak, they all sought to bandwagon with Russia in some way, mainly by 
joining the Russian-led institutions of the CIS and the CSTO. However, with an increase in state 
power, particularly in Georgia and Azerbaijan, but to a lesser degree in Armenia, these 
countries were able to move away from bandwagoning with Russia and towards pursuing a 
more independent foreign policy based on their national interests. For example, in Georgia 
this meant pursuing a radically pro-western foreign policy (after the Georgian UNM under 
Saakashvili came to power) that was compatible with the ideology and beliefs of leaders. In 
Azerbaijan, this meant pursuing a balancing strategy, keeping all partners at arm’s length so 
as to avoid bandwagoning and causing problems with its neighbours while allowing it to 
exploit its resource potential, as well as inviting the presence of a larger number of powers 
into the region and creating an environment of greater regional balance, which does not allow 
Russia to dominate Azerbaijan.   
Armenia is different in this regard, in contrast to Azerbaijan and Georgia’s strategies to move 
away from Russian dependence. As noted by the interviewees, Armenia’s strategic 
partnership with Russia has continuously developed to the extent that Armenia and Russia 
are very deeply integrated in all aspects. That is not to say, however, that Armenia has not 
pursued relations with other actors. Even since Robert Kocharyan came to power, Armenia 
has sought deeper relations with the EU (even going so far as to call the EU Armenia’s 
“civilizational choice” (Åberg & Terzyan, 2018, p. 170)), although, while being hindered to a 
large degree by the partnership with Russia, progress has been made to the extent that 
Armenia signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in 
54 
 
2017.55 Thus, systemic constraints being what they are, Armenia does nevertheless seek to 
balance as much as it can to maintain its independence and improve its prosperity.  
In terms of theoretical implications, the expert interviews have shown that while the 
countries were particularly weak during the early 1990s, the lack of state power, as well as 
the lack of territorial integrity led Georgia and Azerbaijan to exhibit bandwagoning behaviour 
towards Russia, thus allowing Russia significant control over, and continued presence in, the 
region and the breakaway territories, which remains to this day. Armenia too has exhibited 
bandwagoning behaviour with Russia due to its role as Armenia’s security guarantor, which 
again has remained as yet unchanged. On the other hand, after the significant development 
in state capacity in Georgia (in the early-mid 2000s) and Azerbaijan (since the mid-1990s), 
these countries have been able to largely develop their own independent foreign policy 
strategies based on national (and FPE) interests. These findings support the structural realist 
theory that suggests relative power capabilities are a key driving force in international 
relations. This trend of increasing foreign policy independence due to increased state power 
could be generalised to other countries that have experienced rapid state development. 
Moreover, through a neoclassical realist theoretical framework using different types of 
intervening variables, it is also clearer to identify at which level specifically cases of IVV 
influence have occurred. In the case of this study, IVVs of the “elite preferences” type have 
occurred most frequently, which suggests that when an opportunity for influence occurs, it is 
more often at the level of the decision-makers themselves in the case of the Georgia and 
Armenia. Indeed, the comparatively more frequent occurrence of elite preferences variables 
in Armenia shows that, while producing minor foreign policy outcomes, the Armenian FPE are 
able to exert some agency outside of systemic constraints in their foreign policymaking. The 
reason for this, I suggest in the case of the leadership of Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Serzh 
Sargsyan, was the Armenian FPE’s desire to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which, 
while potentially bringing them into an uneasy position vis-à-vis Armenian society, was the 
ultimate goal of Armenian foreign policymakers.       
Going back to Walt’s (1990) original predictions of when and how states tend to bandwagon 
or balance against threats, the current study has demonstrated that the conditions under 
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which these small states have bandwagoned with another country have been when they were 
at there weakest. All three countries’ dependence on Russia during the early 1990s, when 
they were at their weakest, is testament to this. As Georgia and Azerbaijan grew in state 
power, they gradually moved away from bandwagoning towards pursuing effective balancing 
strategies (which has been most visibly effective in Azerbaijan).  Furthermore, while Armenia 
still exhibits bandwagoning behaviour with Russia in terms of security, it has demonstrated 
its somewhat pro-western colours in its attempts to improve relations, particularly with the 
EU, which suggests that if Armenia were more independent from Russia, it would pursue a 
similar path to Georgia.  
The timeframe in which the variables were influential varied, producing outcomes that lasted 
from days to years. Perhaps the most significant occurrence in this regard was the 2008 
Russia-Georgia War, which had a lasting impact on both Georgian and Azerbaijani foreign 
policy and resulted in significant foreign policy changes. However, most occurrences of IVVs 
had short-term outcomes and resulted only in minor policy shifts.   
Based on the neoclassical realist theoretical framework, taking the presupposed supreme role 
of systemic stimuli into account, the study has shown that even in small states, where the role 
systemic stimuli in foreign policymaking would be the main drivers of foreign policy, unit-level 
intervening variables have the opportunity to influence policy outcomes. However, the role 
of IVVs has been shown to be often very minor and, as predicted by neoclassical realist theory, 
systemic stimuli are indeed the most important in terms of their influence. The intervening 
variables identified have had a modifying effect on foreign policy. That is, the IVVs have had 
some influence on the foreign policy outcomes in the South Caucasus, but the overall drivers 
of foreign policy have been systemic factors. This is not to say, of course, that previous studies 
of foreign policy in the South Caucasus are invalid. On the contrary, this study has 
demonstrated that IVVs do have influence on foreign policy, which is often subtle and can be 
very revealing in terms of how exactly they influence foreign policy.  
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6 Conclusion  
This study has attempted to demonstrate the applicability of neoclassical realism for foreign 
policy analysis in the South Caucasus. Due to the nature of small and weak states in the 
international system, many foreign policy behaviours are exaggerated in scale, and these 
states have proven themselves to be an excellent ground for theory testing. By taking these 
three small countries of the same post-Soviet region, which are bound by similar histories and 
political systems, a neoclassical realist examination of their foreign policies has shown that 
the theory can be utilised to identify and explain numerous intervening variables that 
influence foreign policy. It also helps to explain the extent to which variables common to all 
three countries, such as Russian pressure, have the capacity to influence each country’s 
foreign policy in different ways.  
Building on previous literature, much of which focuses on particular intervening variables, it 
is clear that the foreign policies of the states of the South Caucasus are influenced by multiple 
factors. Systemic constraints have limited the ability of foreign policymakers in the region to 
varying degrees and at various times. Having demonstrated that unit-level intervening 
variables had the most influence at the level of the decisionmakers, and least of all at the level 
of domestic institutions in the South Caucasus, this study shows that neoclassical realist 
theory should be most applicable in examining states with greater relative power capabilities, 
since, as shown by the research collected, unit-level intervening variables played a much 
smaller role in weak states, as exemplified by Georgia and Azerbaijan during the early 1990s.       
This study has also proved itself as a test of the applicability of neoclassical realism for foreign 
policy analysis of small states. The results gained from the interviews demonstrated that while 
the international system and relative power capabilities were the most important factors in 
these countries’ foreign policymaking, intervening variables were identified to have influence, 
albeit often minor, thus showing that it was possible to identify IVV influence in an otherwise 
system-level variable dominated area of foreign policy. As such, one important conclusion 
that can be drawn from this is that small state foreign policy should not be dismissed by 
structural realists for the understandable presumption that these states are bound solely by 
the systemic stimuli. Moreover, neoclassical realism has great value in small state foreign 
policy analysis due to its powerful ability to explain phenomena from the level of the 
individual decisionmaker up to the level of the international system. Such an all-
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encompassing approach has its limits, however, since neoclassical realism’s explanatory 
power is highest in analysing specific unit-level phenomena, such as the causes of a particular 
foreign policy decision. The previous studies that have employed neoclassical realism have 
also been most effective at explaining foreign policy outcomes by examining decisionmaker-
level variables.  
With the research that was conducted as part of this study – the expert interviews – I hoped 
to offer a more comprehensive source of information. This has been especially useful, since I 
was able to gather the most recent information available, which was collected during the 
summer of 2019. In doing so, I was able to identify very recent occurrences of IVV influence, 
such as the case of the summer 2019 Georgian protests, which saw the Georgian 
government’s change in rhetoric towards Russia and resulted in a diplomatic incident. 
Moreover, by having in-depth and detailed discussions with foreign policy experts, I was able 
to go into great detail with their information, from which I found cases that in all probability 
would normally have been overlooked.   
In terms of the constraints of the study, it would be useful in the future to acquire a greater 
range of interview data to draw upon, which would offer the possibility to create a more 
quantitative analysis and offer more solid information to analyse. Moreover, in hindsight, it 
would be wise to employ a more direct approach in terms of interview structure, such as 
structured interviews, as semi-structured interviews, while useful in gaining broad and in-
depth knowledge of a subject, can often lead to gaining many indirect answers and make the 
required information more obscure and difficult to identify. That being said, the interviews 
conducted as part of this study offered a vast amount of extremely useful information, from 
which I have been able to draw some significant conclusions.   
As a recommendation for further study, I would suggest future neoclassical realist 
examinations of foreign policy should focus more specifically on comparisons of a smaller 
number of countries or individual cases to be able to offer a more in-depth analysis or, on the 
other hand, conduct a larger-scale analysis with a greater number of countries, but examining 
a specific phenomenon common to each. Nevertheless, the findings of the original expert 
interviews analysed through a neoclassical realist theoretical framework resulted in a study 
that has demonstrated the utility of neoclassical realism in small state foreign policy analysis.    
58 
 
7 Bibliography 
Åberg, J. H., & Terzyan, A. (2018). Structure or agency? Explaining Armenia's foreign policy evolution. 
Eastern Journal of European Studies, 9(1), 151-172. 
Atoyan, V. (2015). Внешнеполитический Выбор Армении: Политика Обеспечения Максимальной 
Безопасности [Foreign Policy of Armenia: Ensuring Maximal Security]. Проблемы 
постсоветского пространства [Post Soviet Issues], 96-120. 
Chitadze, N. (2019, June 25). Interview on Georgia. (J. Gill, Interviewer) 
Darchiashvili, D. (2019, June 25). Interview on Georgia. (J. Gill, Interviewer) 
de Waal, T. (2010). The Caucasus: an Introduction. Oxford University Press. 
Elman, M. F. (1995, April). The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own 
Backyard. British Journal of Political Science, 25(2), 171-217. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fs0007123400007146 
Gvalia, G., Lebanidze, B., & Siroky, D. S. (2019). Neoclassical realism and small states: systemic 
constraints and domestic filters in Georgia's foreign policy. East European Politics, 35(1), 21-
51. 
Gvalia, G., Siroky, D., Lebanidze, B., & Iashvili, Z. (2013). Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the 
Foreign Policies of Small States. Security Studies, 22(1), 98-131. 
Hudson, V. M. (2014). Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Second Edition ed.). 
Rowman and Littlefield. 
Ibrahimov, R. (2019, August 20). Interview on Azerbaijan. (J. Gill, Interviewer) 
Kakachia, K., Minesashvili, S., & Levan, K. (2018). Change and Continuity in the Foreign Policy of Small 
States: Elite Perceptions and Georgia's Foreign Policy Towards Russia. Europe-Asia Studies, 
70(5), 814-831. 
Kambeck, M. (2014). Between the Big Blocs: Armenian Foreign Policy Untangled. European View, 13, 
29-38. 
Karapetyan, A. (2019, August 02). Interview on Armenia. (J. Gill, Interviewer) 
Mamishova, N. (2019, August 26). Interview on Azerbaijan. (J. Gill, Interviewer) 
(2018). National Security Concept of Georgia. Retrieved from 
http://mod.gov.ge/uploads/2018/pdf/NSC-ENG.pdf 
Nodia, G. (2019, July 10). Interview on Georgia. (J. Gill, Interviewer) 
Oskanian, K. (2016). The Balance Strikes Back: Power, Perceptions, and Ideology in Georgian Foreign 
Policy, 1992-2014. Foreign Policy Analysis, 12, 628-652. 
59 
 
Papazian, T. (2006). From Ter-Petrossian to Kocharian: Explaining Continuity in Armenian Foreign 
Policy, 1991-2003. Demokratizatsiya, 14(2). 
Paronyan , H. L. (2014). Евразийский Экономический Союз: Отношение к Проекту Южно-
Кавказских Государств [Eurasian Economic Union: Attitude of the South Caucasus toward the 
Project]. Кафедра политических наук, Россиийский университет дружбы народов [RUDN 
Journal of Political Science], 0(3) , 96-104. 
Poghosyan, B. (2019, July 08). Interview on Armenia. (J. Gill, Interviewer) 
Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W., & Lobell, S. E. (2016). Neoclassical Realist Theory of International 
Politics . Oxford University Press. doi:DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899234.001.0001 
Rose, G. (1998, October). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics, 51, 144-
172. 
Schweller, R. L. (2006). Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. Princeton 
University Press. 
Sharashenidze, T. (2019, June 26). Interview on Georgia. (J. Gill, Interviewer) 
Simmel, G. (1955). Conflict. (K. H. Wolff, Trans.) Free Press. 
Souleimanov, E. A., Abrahamyan, E., & Aliyev, H. (2018). Unrecognized states as a means of coercive 
diplomacy? Assessing the role of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Russia's foreign policy in the 
South Caucasus. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 18(1), 73-86. 
Taliaferro, J. W. (2006). State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource 
Extractive State. Security Studies, 15:3, 464-495. 
Valiyev, A. (2019, August 14). Interview on Azerbaijan. (J. Gill, Interviewer) 
Valiyev, A., & Mamishova, N. (2019). Azerbaijan's foreign policy towards Russia since independence: 
compromise achieved. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 19(1), 269-291. 
Van Gils, E. (2018). Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy Strategies and the European Union: Successful 
Resistance and Pursued Influence. Europe-Asia Studies, 70(5), 738-758. 
Vardazaryan, M. (2014). Республика Армения перед Выбором между Новыми Инициативами 
Росиийской Федерации и «Восточным Партнёрством» Евросоюза [Armenia: an Uneasy 
Choice between Russia's New Initiatives and the EU Eastern Partnership]. Вестник МГИМО 
Университета [MGIMO Review of International Relations] , 1(34), 31-36. 
Walt, S. M. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. The MIT Press. 
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics . Addison-Wesley Publishing Company . 
 
 
